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“How glorious it is, but how painful it is also, to be 
exceptional in this world!”1
INTRODUCTION 
 
From time to time, the federal legislature has shown 
itself to be decisively responsive to problems both large and 
small.  One of those problems is cybersquatting—the 
registration of domain names that are similar or identical to 
distinctive or famous trademarks for the purpose of confusing 
consumers or extorting the trademarks’ holders.  In the 
remarkably short period between June and November of 
1999, Congress enacted the Anticybersquatting Consumer 
Protection Act (ACPA or Act),2
 
 1. ALFRED DE MUSSET, HISTOIRE D’UN MERLE BLANC [The Story of a White 
Blackbird] (1842), translated in BARTLETT’S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 488 (17th 
ed. 2002). 
 an amendment to the 
 2. Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, S. 1255, 106th Cong. 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (1999)).  Notwithstanding the title 
of the enacting legislation, section 1125(d) is titled “Cyberpiracy prevention.”  15 
U.S.C. § 1125(d).  Although there is a fine distinction between “cyberpiracy” and 
“cybersquatting,” the two are used interchangeably in both the case law and 
scholarly literature.  See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 444 (9th ed. 2009) (defining 
“cyberpiracy” as “[t]he act of registering a well-known name or mark (or one 
that is confusingly similar) as a website’s domain name, usu[ally] for the 
purpose of deriving revenue,” recognizing “cybersquatting” as “[o]ne form of 
cyberpiracy,” and then defining “cybersquatting” as “[t]he act of reserving a 
domain name on the Internet, esp[ecially] a name that would be associated with 
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Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), to provide 
particularized relief from cybersquatting.  Recognizing the 
need to expand existing traditional trademark law to keep 
pace with this particular type of Internet fraud,3
The bad faith of any alleged cybersquatter is a central 
component of liability under the ACPA.  To protect innocent 
registrants, the cause of action only attaches to those with “a 
bad faith intent to profit from that mark.”  Intending to 
narrowly limit the scope of the Act, Congress carefully 
“keyed” liability to cybersquatters’s bad faith by making it an 
element of the cybersquatting violation.
 Congress 
passed legislation that created a civil cause of action for the 
registration, trafficking, or use of a domain name that is 
identical or confusingly similar to a distinctive or famous 
mark. 
4  Additionally, 
Congress explicitly prescribed the evidence courts should 
consider in determining whether such bad faith exists.5
This bad faith requirement, as well as other provisions of 
the ACPA, has created significant confusion about its 
 
 
a company’s trademark, and then seeking to profit by selling or licensing the 
name to the company that has an interest in being identified with it”); see, e.g., 
Int’l Profit Assocs., Inc. v. Paisola, 461 F. Supp. 2d 672, 677 n.5 (N.D. Ill. 2006) 
(“Although [plaintiff] refers to this claim as a ‘cyberpiracy’ claim, courts 
addressing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) have referred to this section as a ‘cybersquatting’ 
provision.”); Microsoft Corp. v. Shah, No. C10-0653 RSM, 2011 WL 108954, at 
*1 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 12, 2011) (“The Anti–Cybersquatting Consumer Protection 
Act (‘ACPA’) creates liability for certain forms of cyberpiracy.”); Harrods Ltd. v. 
Sixty Internet Domain Names, 110 F. Supp. 2d 420, 426 (E.D. Va. 2000) (“as its 
title reflects, the AntiCybersquatting Consumer Protection Act was designed to 
combat ‘cybersquatting’ or ‘cyberpiracy’ ”).  Given the prevalence of the term 
“cybersquatting” to describe both that particular kind of cyberpiracy and 
“cyberpiracy” more generally within the meaning of section 1125(d), the former 
term is used here for consistency and easy reading. 
 3. See Cybersquatting and Consumer Protection: Ensuring Domain Name 
Integrity: Hearing on S. 1255 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 
1–2 (1999) (statement of Sen. Spencer Abraham); see also Interstellar Starship 
Servs., Ltd. v. Epix, Inc., 304 F.3d 936, 946 (9th Cir. 2002) (observing that 
“Cybersquatting is the Internet version of a land grab. Cybersquatters register 
well-known brand names as Internet domain names in order to force the 
rightful owners of the marks to pay for the right to engage in electronic 
commerce under their own name”) (citing Virtual Works, Inc. v. Volkswagen of 
America Inc., 238 F.3d 264, 267 (4th Cir. 2001) (“The ACPA was enacted in 
1999 in response to concerns over the proliferation of cybersquatting-the 
Internet version of a land grab.”)). 
 4. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d); see also discussion infra Part I. 
 5. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i) (listing evidence to be considered in 
determining bad faith). 
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relationship with traditional trademark law embodied in the 
rest of the Lanham Act.  The ACPA provides remedies from 
cybersquatting, including actual damages, profits, costs, 
attorney’s fees “in exceptional cases,” as well as statutory 
damages that were already available under the Lanham Act 
for other violations of trademark rights.6  Courts have 
struggled to provide an articulation of when a cybersquatting 
case is “exceptional.”7
Under other provisions of the Lanham Act focused on 
other trademark disputes, attorney’s fees could be awarded in 
cases when a defendant acts in particularly bad faith.
 
8  But 
under the ACPA, bad faith is already an element of liability.9
A recent circuit split about Lanham Act remedies 
implicates whether attorney’s fees are available in 
cybersquatting cases where the plaintiff elects to receive 
statutory damages in place of actual damages.
  
This leads to an important question: if bad faith does no more 
than define an unexceptional cybersquatter, what defines the 
exceptional cybersquatter? 
10
 
 6. See discussion infra Part I.A–B (comparing the ACPA with the rest of 
the Lanham Act). 
  The analysis 
and discussion of this question are presented in Part II of this 
paper, and suggest that attorney’s fees are in fact available to 
cybersquatting plaintiffs when they elect to receive statutory 
damages.  Part III of this paper proceeds to consider the more 
vexing and consequential confusion created by the novelty 
and centrality of “bad faith intent to profit” in cybersquatting 
cases, given that bad faith is a judicially-recognized hallmark 
of an “exceptional case” in many jurisdictions and a finding 
that a case is exceptional is a threshold determination 
necessary to any discretionary award of attorney’s fees under 
the Lanham Act.  Building on the discussion in Part II, this 
Part focuses on cases where statutory damages are available 
for substantive violations of the ACPA but attorney’s fees 
may not be awarded—not because the text or legislative 
history of the statute does not permit such an award per se 
 7. See discussion infra Part II (describing the circuit split vis-à-vis 
attorney’s fees awards under the ACPA and the Lanham Act). 
 8. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2008); see also discussion infra Part II. 
 9. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d). 
 10. See discussion infra Part II (articulating the split in authority 
represented by Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Ly USA, Inc., 676 F.3d 83 (2d 
Cir. 2012) and K & N Eng’g v. Bulat, 510 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 2007)). 
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but because the cases are not “exceptional” as the term is 
properly understood in context. 
This paper argues that in order for the two standards—
“bad faith intent to profit” and “exceptional cases”—to remain 
distinct, they must be distinguishable.  Attorney’s fees in 
trademark cases can only be awarded in “exceptional cases,” 
and courts have interpreted “exceptional” to include cases 
where the defendant acted in bad faith.  And although all 
cybersquatting cases require a showing of “bad faith intent to 
profit,” not all cybersquatting cases merit an award of 
attorney’s fees.  Therefore, the definition of what makes a 
cybersquatter “exceptional” for the purpose of awarding 
attorney’s fees must be something different from simply “bad 
faith intent to profit.”  This paper attempts to refine the 
distinction between the two standards by defining “the 
exceptional cybersquatter” and the types of conduct that go 
beyond “bad faith intent to profit” and therefore justify an 
exercise of the extraordinary discretion to award attorney’s 
fees.  In short, this paper argues that the exceptional 
cybersquatter is one who (1) engages in certain willful 
conduct distinguishable from the “bad faith intent to profit” 
during the course of litigation or (2) engages in conduct 
indistinguishable from the “bad faith intent to profit” but 
nevertheless considered willful under the Lanham Act.11
Notwithstanding the relief provided by the ACPA, 
cybersquatting continues to be a problem demonstrated by 
the increasing number of cybersquatting claims brought 
before courts in the United States
 
12
 
 11. See discussion infra Part III. 
 and international 
arbitration organizations accredited by the Internet 
 12. A search of Bloomberg Law’s database of all U.S. District Court dockets 
for the term “cybersquatting” between November 1999 (when the ACPA was 
enacted) and December 31, 2012 returned 27 hits for years 1999 and 2000; 20 
for 2001; 28 for 2002; 39 for 2003; 40 for 2004; 56 for 2005; 68 for 2006; 111 for 
2007; 168 for 2008; 223 for 2009; 210 for 2010; 268 for 2011; and 318 for 2012.  
The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts provides very useful case statistics 
on its website but does not provide the number of cybersquatting cases 
commenced during any particular period.  See, e.g., U.S. DISTRICT COURTS—
CIVIL CASES COMMENCED, BY BASIS OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF SUIT, 
DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIODS ENDING JUNE 30, 2011 AND 2012 30–33 tbl. C-
2,, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/StatisticalTablesFor 
TheFederalJudiciary/2012/june/C02Jun12.pdf (providing numbers of copyright, 
patent, and trademark cases, but not specific types of cases within those 
broader, “Nature of Suit” categories). 
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Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), 
including the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO).13  Given current trends, and ICANN’s introduction of 
new top-level domain names in June 2013,14 cybersquatting 
will likely continue to be an important and lively area of the 
law for years to come.  In fact, some have called on Congress 
to amend the ACPA to deal with the threatened explosion of 
cybersquatting claims that the new top-level domain names 
will ignite.15
 
 13. In March 2013, WIPO reported a record-setting 2,884 cybersquatting 
filings for the previous year, a 4.5% increase in the number of filings from the 
year before.  See BloombergBNA World Communications. Regulation Report, 
Domain Names: WIPO Cites Continued Rise in Cybersquatting Complaints 
(April 5, 2013).  See also Tenesa S.  Scaturro, The Anticybersquatting Consumer 
Protection Act and the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy the 
First Decade: Looking Back and Adapting Forward, 11 Nev. L.J. 877 (2011) 
(reporting that 3,866 domain name dispute cases were filed with WIPO and the 
National Arbitration Forum in 2009). 
  Although legislation may indeed be necessary to 
provide relief from that problem, the problems addressed in 
this paper—the availability of attorney’s fees when statutory 
damages are elected under the ACPA and the distinction 
between cases involving exceptional cybersquatters where 
attorney’s fees are appropriate and those where they are 
not—are wholly remediable through better-informed 
application of existing statutory text. 
 14. A top-level domain name refers to a domain at the highest level of the 
hierarchical Domain Name System. Examples of top-level domains are .com, 
.edu, .mil, etc. Before 2013, companies could register sites on only 22 generic 
top-level domains (gTLDs). Ian Paul, The Top 10 Proposed New Top-Level 
Domains So Far, PC WORLD (Jun. 12, 2012, 10:31 AM), 
http://www.pcworld.com/article/257430/the_top_10_proposed_new_top_level_do
mains_so_far.html.  ICANN has since received over 1,900 applications for new 
gTLDs.  See New GTLD Current Application Status, ICANN, 
https://gtldresult.icann.org/application-result/applicationstatus (last visited 
Mar. 22, 2014).  It is unclear exactly what effect the new generic top-level 
domain names that ICANN plans to implement in June of 2013 will have on the 
number of cybersquatting claims in the future.  See MELBOURNE IT DIGITAL 
BRAND SERVS., GET OFF MY LAWN: 2012 CYBERSQUATTING REVIEW, available at 
www.melbourneit.info/news-centre/Releases/2012_Cybersquatting_Report.pdf 
(predicting that the new top-level domain names will not likely cause a rise in 
the number of cybersquatting claims). 
 15. See Amy E. Bivens,  Group Pushes for ACPA Reform, Citing Added 
Cybersquatting Risks From New TLDs, BLOOMBERG BNA ELECTRONIC COM. & 
LAW REP. (April 26, 2013). 
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I. THE ANTICYBERSQUATTING CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 
AND THE LANHAM ACT 
Properly considering and resolving the two issues 
addressed in this paper first requires a brief overview of the 
ACPA and the Lanham Act.  The ambiguity in the text and 
legislative history of both statutes creates some confusion as 
to what remedies are available in certain kinds of trademark 
cases, including cybersquatting cases.  This Part first 
considers the ACPA, its text, and its history before 
summarizing its relationship to the background law of the 
Lanham Act and the remedies for trademark infringement, 
including cybersquatting, included in 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). 
A. The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act 
The ACPA creates a substantive, civil cause of action for 
trademark owners against those who register, traffic in, or 
use domain names that are protected trademarks, words, or 
names or are identical or confusingly similar to distinctive or 
famous marks with “a bad faith intent to profit” from those 
marks.16  Senator Spencer Abraham first introduced the 
ACPA in June 1999.17  This initial proposed legislation 
included, among other provisions, the option to elect actual 
damages and profits, or statutory damages under the 
statutory provision.18  If a plaintiff sought statutory damages, 
the statute provided for an award of “full costs and 
reasonable attorney’s fees.”19  Additionally, the proposed 
legislation imposed criminal penalties.20
Although the initial proposal for the ACPA contained 
many of the key provisions that were later enacted, some 
substitutes were required before the bill became law.  For 
example, Senator Abraham acknowledged that suggestions on 
the proposed bill “convinced [him] of the need for substitute 
legislation which addresses the issue of in rem jurisdiction 
 
 
 16. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1) (2012). 
 17. Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, S. 1255, 106th Cong. 
(1999)).  
 18. Id. § 3 (trademark remedies).  See also 158 CONG. REC. S7336 (daily ed. 
Jun. 22, 1999) (“a plaintiff may – instead of seeking actual damages or profits – 
elect to recover statutory damages . . . Furthermore, the plaintiff may recover 
full costs and reasonable attorney’s fees.”). 
 19. S. 1255 § 3 (trademark remedies).  
 20. Id. § 4 (criminal use of counterfeit trademark).  
CUMBY FINAL 5/23/2014  12:41 PM 
306 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54 
and which eliminate[s] provisions dealing with criminal 
penalties.”21  Nowhere did Senator Abraham mention the 
original bill’s provision for attorney’s fees awards.  However, 
he did generally describe the substantive provisions of the 
substitute legislation,22 noting that it would “key[] liability on 
the bad faith of a party” and “specify the evidence which may 
be used to establish the bad faith of an individual,” part of 
Congress’s effort to provide complete protection for so-called 
“innocent infringers.”23  Senator Abraham also noted that the 
substitute legislation “provides for statutory civil damages” 
that the plaintiff may elect “in lieu of actual damages or 
profits.”24
Defining “bad faith intent to profit” by “specif[ying] the 
evidence which may be used to establish” it is critical to both 
achieving the underlying purpose of the act—the protection of 
trademark rights in the Internet age—and the protection of 
“innocent infringers.”
 
25
(I) the trademark or other intellectual property rights of 
the person, if any, in the domain name; 
  To that end, the ACPA provides a 
non-exclusive list of nine factors that may be considered in 
determining whether a person accused of cybersquatting has 
the requisite “bad faith intent to profit” from a protected 
mark: 
(II) the extent to which the domain name consists of the 
 
 21. Cybersquatting and Consumer Protection: Ensuring Domain Name 
Integrity: Hearing on S. 1255 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 
2 (1999) (statement of  Sen. Spencer Abraham). 
 22. S. 1255. 
 23. Cybersquatting and Consumer Protection: Ensuring Domain Name 
Integrity: Hearing on S. 1255 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 
2–3 (1999) (statement of  Sen. Spencer Abraham). 
 24. Id. at 3. 
 25. Id. at 2–3.  See also Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 110 
F. Supp. 2d 420, 426 (E.D. Va. 2000) (“Every provision of the ACPA reflects 
Congress’s intent to address the cybersquatting problem, not the innocent or 
good-faith registration of domain names that may infringe existing trade 
marks.”) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 106-464, at 109 (1999) (Conf. Rep.) (“The bill is 
carefully and narrowly tailored, however, to extend only to cases where the 
plaintiff can demonstrate that the defendant registered, trafficked in, or used 
the offending domain name with bad-faith intent to profit from the goodwill of a 
mark belonging to someone else. Thus, the bill does not extend to innocent 
domain name registrations”); S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 8 (1999) (“[u]nder the bill 
 . . . the abusive conduct that is made actionable is appropriately limited just to 
bad-faith registrations and uses of others’ marks by persons who seek to profit 
unfairly from the goodwill associated therewith”). 
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legal name of the person or a name that is otherwise 
commonly used to identify that person; 
(III) the person’s prior use, if any, of the domain name in 
connection with the bona fide offering of any goods or 
services; 
(IV) the person’s bona fide noncommercial or fair use of 
the mark in a site accessible under the domain name; 
(V) the person’s intent to divert consumers from the mark 
owner’s online location to a site accessible under the 
domain name that could harm the goodwill represented by 
the mark, either for commercial gain or with the intent to 
tarnish or disparage the mark, by creating a likelihood of 
confusion as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or 
endorsement of the site; 
(VI) the person’s offer to transfer, sell, or otherwise assign 
the domain name to the mark owner or any third party for 
financial gain without having used, or having an intent to 
use, the domain name in the bona fide offering of any 
goods or services, or the person’s prior conduct indicating 
a pattern of such conduct; 
(VII) the person’s provision of material and misleading 
false contact information when applying for the 
registration of the domain name, the person’s intentional 
failure to maintain accurate contact information, or the 
person’s prior conduct indicating a pattern of such 
conduct; 
(VIII) the person’s registration or acquisition of multiple 
domain names which the person knows are identical or 
confusingly similar to marks of others that are distinctive 
at the time of registration of such domain names, or 
dilutive of famous marks of others that are famous at the 
time of registration of such domain names, without regard 
to the goods or services of the parties; and 
(IX) the extent to which the mark incorporated in the 
person’s domain name registration is or is not distinctive 
and famous within the meaning of subsection (c) of this 
section.26
 
 26. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(I)–(IX) (2012) (these factors will be referred 
to throughout the remainder of this paper as “ACPA factor one,” “ACPA factor 
two,” etc.).  Subsection (c) of 15 U.S.C. § 1125 defines and prescribes remedies 
for trademark dilution by blurring and tarnishment.  See also Cybersquatting 
and Consumer Protection: Ensuring Domain Name Integrity: Hearing on S. 
1255 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 2 (1999) (statement of 
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In addition to these factors, the ACPA also provides that 
“[b]ad faith intent . . . shall not be found in any case in which 
the court determines that the person believed and had 
reasonable grounds to believe that the use of the domain 
name was a fair use or otherwise lawful.”27  Further, 
cybersquatting liability for using a domain name will only 
attach if a “person is the domain name registrant or that 
registrant’s authorized licensee.”28
The importance of the bad faith intent factors should not 
be undermined by their permissive, non-exclusive character.  
Defining “bad faith intent to profit” is critical in defining 
liability under the ACPA, as Senator Abraham stressed at the 
first hearing on the proposed legislation that would later 
become the ACPA: 
 
The substitute will incorporate substantial protections for 
innocent parties, keying liability on the bad faith of a 
party.  Civil liability would attach only if a person had no 
intellectual property rights in the domain name identifier; 
the domain name identifier was not the person’s legal first 
name or surname; and the person registered, acquired, or 
used the domain name identified with the bad-faith intent 
to benefit from the goodwill of another’s trademark or 
service mark. 
And just to be clear of our intent here, this substitute 
legislation specifies the evidence which may be used to 
establish the bad faith of an individual.29
This is significant for purposes of distinguishing between 
the “specific” intent to profit from the goodwill of a mark 
(“bad faith intent to profit”) under the ACPA and the 
“general” intent (“bad faith”) sufficient to render a case 
“exceptional” under the Lanham Act for purposes of awarding 
attorney’s fees in some jurisdictions.
 
30
 
Sen. Spencer Abraham) (“Civil liability would attach only if a person had no 
intellectual property rights in the domain name identifier; the domain name 
identifier was not the person’s legal first name or surname; and the person 
registered, acquired, or used the domain name identified with the bad-faith 
intent to benefit from the goodwill of another’s trademark or service mark.”). 
  The list of factors is 
 27. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(ii) (the so-called “safe harbor” provision). 
 28. Id. § 1125(d)(1)(D). 
 29. Cybersquatting and Consumer Protection: Ensuring Domain Name 
Integrity: Hearing on S. 1255 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 
2–3 (1999) (statement of Sen. Spencer Abraham). 
 30. See Solid Host, NL v. Namecheap, Inc., 652 F. Supp. 2d 1092, 1109 (C.D. 
Cal. 2009) (“The bad faith required to support a cybersquatting claim is not 
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nonexclusive and nonexhaustive because a defendant may, 
for instance, provide erroneous contact information in 
registering a domain name or register multiple domain 
names that are identical or confusingly similar to a mark 
without any “bad faith intent to profit” from the goodwill of 
the mark.31  Thus, as “the presence or absence of any of these 
factors may not be determinative” of bad faith intent to 
profit,32
Early amendments to the ACPA bill also sought to 
remedy a pernicious and persistent problem in domain name 
litigation—the inability of some plaintiffs to establish the 
existence of personal jurisdiction over alleged cybersquatters, 
particularly those located outside the United States who 
provided deliberately misleading or false contact information 
to domain name registrars.
 the presence or absence of any of the factors must 
also not be determinative of “bad faith” generally. 
33
 
general bad faith, but ‘a bad faith intent to profit from the mark,’ 15 U.S.C. § 
1125(d)(1)(A)(i) (emphasis added).  Thus, the defendant must intend to profit 
specifically from the goodwill associated with another’s trademark.”).  See infra 
notes 182–89 and accompanying text. 
  Accordingly, the final version of 
the ACPA provides for in rem jurisdiction in cases where the 
owner of a mark is unable “to obtain in personam 
jurisdiction” over a prospective cybersquatting defendant, or 
when the owner is unable to find the defendant “through due 
 31. S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 9 (1999) (“[T]he fact that a defendant provided 
erroneous information in applying for a domain name registration or registered 
multiple domain names that were identical to, confusingly similar to, or dilutive 
of distinctive marks does not necessarily show bad-faith.  The Committee 
recognizes that such false information may be provided without a bad-faith 
intent to trade on the goodwill of another’s mark, and that there are likely to be 
instances in which multiple domain name registrations are consistent with 
honest business practices.  Similar caveats can be made for each of the eight 
balancing factors, which is why the list of factors is nonexclusive and 
nonexhaustive.”) 
 32. Id. 
 33. See Cybersquatting and Consumer Protection: Ensuring Domain Name 
Integrity: Hearing on S. 1255 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 
14–15 (1999) (statement of Gregory D. Philips, Esq., Porsche Cars North 
America, Inc.) (“One necessary component of any effective legislation is an in 
rem jurisdictional provision where a trademark holder can file a lawsuit against 
the domain name itself, rather than the registrant.  Not surprisingly, 
cyberpirates and cybersquatters often provide false and fictitious information as 
to their identity when they register a new domain name diluting or infringing a 
famous trademark.  Cyberpirates do so in order to insulate themselves from 
liability and to make it impossible for trademark holders to effect service of 
process.”). 
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diligence.”34  Remedies in in rem cases are specifically 
“limited to a court order for the forfeiture or cancellation of 
the domain name or the transfer of the domain name to the 
owner of the mark.”35  In in personam cases, “a court may 
order the forfeiture or cancellation of the domain name or the 
transfer of the domain name to the owner of the mark,”36
The final version of the ACPA enumerates several 
different remedies against cybersquatters.  Under section 15 
U.S.C. § 1117(a), a plaintiff may recover actual damages and 
profits for violations of the ACPA “subject to the principles of 
 in 
addition to the remedies provided for violations of the ACPA 
under 15 U.S.C. § 1117. 
 
 34. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A)(ii) (2012).  In in rem cases, the mark owner 
must provide notice “to the registrant of the domain name at the postal and e-
mail address provided by the registrant to the registrar” and publish “notice of 
the action as the court may direct promptly after filing the action” in order to 
effect service of process.  Id. § 1125(d)(2)(A)(ii)(II), (d)(2)(B). 
 35. Id. § 1125(d)(2)(D)(i).  See Cybersquatting and Consumer Protection: 
Ensuring Domain Name Integrity: Hearing on S. 1255 Before the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 3 (1999) (statement of Sen. Spencer Abraham) 
(“Under this legislation, the owner of a mark could bring an in rem action 
against the domain name identifier itself.  This will allow a court to order the 
forfeiture or cancellation of the domain name identifier or the transfer of the 
domain name identifier to the owner of the mark.”).  But see Agri-Supply Co., 
Inc. v. Agrisupply.com, 457 F. Supp. 2d 660, 665 (E.D. Va. 2006).  In Agri-
Supply, the court reasoned that:  
[W]hile § 1125(d)(2)(D)(i) of the ACPA states that “[t]he remedies in an 
in rem action under this paragraph shall be limited to a court order for 
the forfeiture or cancellation of the domain name or the transfer of the 
domain name to the owner of the mark,” the statute continues that “the 
in rem action established under paragraph (2), and any remedy 
available under [that] section, shall be in addition to any other civil 
action or remedy otherwise applicable.”  15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(D)(i) and 
(3) (emphasis added).  By including § 1125(d) within its provisions for 
remedies available for trademark violations within the ambit of the 
Lanham Act, § 1117(a) provides the additional civil remedies provided 
for in ACPA § 1125(d)(3).   
Id. at 665.  Cf. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Unitedair.com, No. 1:12CV0143 
(GBL/JFA), 2012 WL 2838629, at *6–7 (E.D. Va. Jun. 11, 2012) (distinguishing 
Agri-Supply), adopted by, No. 1:12CV143 GBL/JFA, 2012 WL 2838569 (E.D. Va. 
Jul. 9, 2012).  Even accepting the court’s conclusion in Agri-Supply that 
attorney’s fees awards are available in in rem actions despite the express 
limitation of in rem remedies “to a court order for the forfeiture or cancellation 
of the domain name or the transfer of the domain name to the owner of the 
mark,” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(D)(i), the interesting question of whether a res—a 
“thing”—is capable of “malicious, fraudulent, deliberate, or willful” behavior 
such that an in rem case is “exceptional” and an attorney’s fees award is 
warranted is outside the scope of this paper. 
 36. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(C). 
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equity.”37  Congress also amended section 1117 to add 
subsection (d), which provides for statutory damages in 
cybersquatting cases as an alternative remedy.38  In language 
remarkably similar to section 1117(c) (which provides 
statutory damages for trademark counterfeiting rather than 
cybersquatting),39 section 1117(d) provides that 
cybersquatting plaintiffs “may elect . . . to recover, instead of 
actual damages and profits, an award of statutory damages in 
the amount of not less than $1,000 and not more than 
$100,000 per domain name, as the court considers just.”40
As discussed below and in light of the similar statutory 
damages provision set out in 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c), the 
statutory damages provision provided for in section 1117(d) 
seems relatively uncontroversial.
 
41  However, what 
consideration Congress gave to the availability of attorney’s 
fees in addition to statutory damages under section 1117(d) (if 
any) is worth reviewing here for purposes of later analysis of 
that question in Part II.42
It is remarkable (if not persuasive) to note that the ACPA 
bill, as originally introduced, provided for attorney’s fees 
awards.  Later, section 4 of the amended ACPA (damages and 
remedies) omitted mention of awards of attorney’s fees in 
cases where statutory damages were elected in place of actual 
damages and profits.
  In trademark counterfeiting cases, 
attorney’s fees are awarded in addition to statutory damages 
under section 1117(c) only in “exceptional cases.”  The similar 
language in section 1117(d) for cybersquatting cases would 
lead one to believe that attorney’s fees would be awarded in 
addition to statutory damages in similar circumstances under 
the ACPA. 
43
 
 37. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2008) (prescribing recovery for violations “under 
section 1125 . . . (d) of this title,” the ACPA). 
  However, the Senate Judiciary 
 38. See infra Part II. 
 39. See infra Part II.D. 
 40. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(d). 
 41. See infra parts II.C–D. 
 42. See TERENCE P. ROSS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: DAMAGES AND 
REMEDIES § 4.03[6] (2013) (“There is no reason . . . to believe that this provision 
[1117(d)] will be interpreted any differently from Section 35(c) [1117(c)] of the 
Lanham Act providing statutory damages for use of counterfeit marks.”). 
 43. S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 3 (1999).  In late October 1999, the House 
Judiciary Committee promulgated its own report on the Trademark 
Cyberpiracy Prevention Act, first introduced earlier that month.  H.R. REP. NO. 
106-412 (1999).   
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Committee Report noted that “under the amended bill, a 
trademark owner who knowingly and materially 
misrepresents to the domain name registrar or registry that a 
domain name is infringing is liable . . . for damages, including 
costs and attorney’s fees, resulting from the suspension, 
cancellation, or transfer of the domain name.”44
The Senate Judiciary Committee’s Report explained the 
need for legislation “to clarify the rights of trademark owners 
with respect to bad faith, abusive domain name registration 
practices, to provide clear deterrence to prevent bad faith and 
abusive conduct, and to provide adequate remedies for 
trademark owners in those cases where it does occur.”
  Thus, even 
though the final version of the ACPA did not contain a 
specific provision for attorney’s fees in addition to statutory 
damages, the language in the Committee Report strongly 
suggests that attorney’s fees should be included in the 
awarded damages, whether those damages are actual or 
statutory. 
45  
Referring to a provision later codified at 15 U.S.C. § 
1125(d)(3),46 the report stated that the addition of a 
cybersquatting provision to the Trademark Act “does not in 
any way limit the application of current provisions of 
trademark, unfair competition and false advertising, or 
dilution law, or other remedies under counterfeiting or other 
statutes, to cybersquatting cases.”47
 
 44. S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 11 (1999) (emphasis added). 
  In its discussion of the 
 45. Id. at 7–8.  See also Cybersquatting and Consumer Protection: Ensuring 
Domain Name Integrity: Hearing on S. 1255 Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 106th Cong. 3 (1999) (statement of Senator Abraham) (“In my 
opinion, online extortion [in the form of cybersquatting] is unacceptable, it is 
outrageous, and it is dangerous to both business and consumers.  I believe that 
these provisions will discourage anyone from squatting on addresses in 
cyberspace to which they are not entitled.”). 
 46. “The civil action established under [15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)] and the in 
rem action established under [15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)], and any remedy available 
under either such action, shall be in addition to any other civil action or remedy 
otherwise applicable.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(3) (2012). 
 47. S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 16 (1999).  See also H.R. REP. NO. 106-412, at 14 
(1999) (noting that the addition of a cyberpiracy provision to the Trademark Act 
did “not in any way limit the application of current provisions of trademark, 
unfair competition and false advertising, or dilution law, or other remedies 
under counterfeiting or other statutes, to cyberpiracy cases.”).  Nevertheless, 
the Committee was careful to note the narrowness of the ACPA, stating that 
“Congress must not cast its net too broadly or impede the growth of technology, 
and it must be careful to balance the legitimate interests of Internet users with 
the other interests sought to be protected.”  S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 8 (1999).   
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damages and remedies provision, the Committee also noted 
that this section of the amended bill “applies traditional 
trademark remedies, including injunctive relief, recovery of 
defendant’s profits, actual damages, and costs, to 
cybersquatting cases.”48
Given this history, the lack of an explicit reference to 
attorney’s fees for plaintiff trademark owners is best 
understood in comparison to the explicit considerations of 
Congress generally in enacting the ACPA—deterrence of 
trademark infringement on the Internet, the provision of 
adequate remedies to plaintiffs, the continuing salience of 
current Lanham Act provisions, and the traditional remedies 
to be afforded successful plaintiffs.  These considerations 
weigh heavily in favor of the conclusion that Congress did not 
intend to provide for attorney’s fees to defendants only, as 
doing so would undoubtedly undermine extension of the 
deterrent and remedial functions of attorney’s fees in the 
Lanham Act before the enactment of the ACPA. 
 
B. The Lanham Act 
The Lanham Act provides for a wide variety of remedies 
in cases involving trademark rights violations.  What follows 
is a brief overview of the various remedies provided under the 
Lanham Act and, where relevant, the legislative history of 
each.  Specific attention is given to section 1117(a), which 
provides for actual damages, profits, costs, and attorney’s fees 
in “exceptional cases” for trademark infringement (including 
cybersquatting), as well as trademark counterfeiting and 
false advertising.49  Section 1117(b) provides for an award of 
treble damages and “virtually mandatory”50
 
 48. S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 16–17 (1999).  Section 43(d) of the Trademark 
Act is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d).  See also H.R. REP. NO. 106-412, at 15 
(1999) (noting that that the legislation “applies traditional trademark remedies, 
including injunctive relief, recovery of defendant’s profits, actual damages, and 
costs, to cyberpiracy cases under the new section 43(d) of the Trademark Act”).  
The Committee also noted the proposed “amendment to section 35 of the 
Trademark Act to provide for statutory damages in cybersquatting cases.”  S. 
REP. NO. 106-140, at 16–17 (1999).  Section 35 of the Trademark Act is codified 
at 15 U.S.C. § 1117.  See also H.R. REP. NO. 106-412, at 15 (1999) (noting that 
the bill also “amended section 35 of the Trademark Act to provide for statutory 
damages in cyberpiracy cases.”). 
 attorney’s fees in 
 49. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2008). 
 50. See 130 CONG. REC. H12,076 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1984) (Joint Statement 
on Trademark Counterfeiting Legislation); Richard J. Leighton, Awarding 
CUMBY FINAL 5/23/2014  12:41 PM 
314 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54 
cases of intentional trademark counterfeiting where no 
“extenuating circumstances” are found.  Finally, section 
1117(c) provides for statutory damages in cases of trademark 
counterfeiting in language that is remarkably (and 
significantly) similar to section 1117(d), which provides for 
statutory damages awards in cybersquatting cases.51
1. Actual Damages, Treble Damages, and Statutory 
Damages 
 
The actual damages provision of the Lanham Act, section 
1117(a), provides for the recovery of monetary damages for 
certain types of trademark rights violations.  These violations 
include (1) ordinary trademark infringement (2) 
counterfeiting under 15 U.S.C. § 1114; (3) unfair competition, 
including “palming off,” false advertising, and trade dress 
infringement under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); (4) willful trademark 
dilution under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c); and (5) cybersquatting 
under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d).52  Any relief from these acts of 
trademark infringement is “subject to the principles of 
equity.”53  One scholar notes that monetary damages awards 
for trademark infringement are “a rarity,” given the equitable 
discretion this provision affords district courts, the low 
threshold for proving trademark rights violations, and the 
fundamental differences between trademark, patent, and 
copyright law.54
 
Attorneys’ Fees in “Exceptional” Lanham Act Cases: A “Jumble” of “Murky” Law, 
102 TRADEMARK REP. 849, 864–66 (2012). 
 
 51. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c), (d). 
 52. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (prescribing recovery for violations “under section 
1125(a) or (d) of this title, or a willful violation under section 1125(c) of this 
title”). 
 53. Id. 
 54. ROSS, supra note 42, § 4.02.  Ross notes that:  
[T]he underlying purpose of trademark protection is different from 
copyright protection or patent protection.  As one commentator has 
noted, “The primary purpose of patent and copyright law is to 
encourage innovation and creativity, while trademark law seeks to 
avoid deception and confusion of consumers, decrease the cost of 
information in the marketplace, ensure fair competition, and protect 
producers’ investment in their reputation and goodwill.”   
Id. § 4.02 n.4 (quoting 1 DRATLER & MCJOHN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: 
COMMERCIAL, CREATIVE AND INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY § 1.02[5] n. 48 (1991)).  
Ross goes on to note that injunctive relief is preferred in trademark 
infringement cases, and monetary damages as a general rule are only awarded 
in cases of actual confusion or willful infringement.  Id. § 4.02[2].  But see David 
M. Kelly & Scott T. Harlan, Statutory Damages Under the Anticybersquatting 
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Monetary damages under section 1117(a) are calculated 
with respect to (1) the defendant’s profits, (2) the plaintiff’s 
actual damages, and (3) the plaintiff’s costs in bringing the 
action.55  Remarkably, the statute goes on to reiterate the 
court’s broad equitable discretion56
In assessing damages the court may enter judgment, 
according to the circumstances of the case, for any sum 
above the amount found as actual damages, not exceeding 
three times such amount.  If the court shall find that the 
amount of the recovery based on profits is either 
inadequate or excessive the court may in its discretion 
enter judgment for such sum as the court shall find to be 
just, according to the circumstances of the case.  Such sum 
in either of the above circumstances shall constitute 
compensation and not a penalty.
 in making its damages 
calculation: 
57
In 1984, Congress amended the Lanham Act to include 
provisions for mandatory treble damages in specific 
circumstances.
 
58  Subsection (b) of 15 U.S.C. § 1117 provides 
for mandatory awards of treble damages or profits 
(“whichever amount is greater”) and attorney’s fees in cases 
where a defendant intentionally used a counterfeit mark in 
the absence of “extenuating circumstances.”59
 
Consumer Protection Act, BNA PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J., Jun. 13, 2008 
(collecting and discussing numerous cases where court have awarded statutory 
damages in cybersquatting cases).   
  Before 
 55. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (“the plaintiff shall be entitled . . . to recover (1) 
defendant’s profits, (2) any damages sustained by the plaintiff, and (3) the costs 
of the action”); see also ROSS, supra note 42, § 4.03 (stating that that “[t]here are 
four distinct approaches to calculating damages for trademark infringement.  
First, damages can be calculated based on the trademark owner’s actual loss, 
which can include lost profits, price erosion damages, damage to the mark (i.e., 
loss of goodwill) and the expense of corrective advertising. Second, damages can 
be calculated based on a reasonable royalty measure.  [And t]hird, damages can 
be calculated based on the disgorgement of the infringer’s profits.”). 
 56. ROSS, supra note 42, § 4.03 (“This is an extraordinarily broad 
discretionary grant to the district courts.”) (citing Maier Brewing Co. v. 
Fleischmann Distilling Corp., 390 F.2d 117, 121 (9th Cir. 1968)). 
 57. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). 
 58. Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 
2178; 15 U.S.C. § 1117(b). 
 59. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(b) (“In assessing damages under subsection (a) for any 
violation of section 1114(1)(a) of this title or section 220506 of Title 36, in a case 
involving use of a counterfeit mark or designation (as defined in section 1116(d) 
of this title), the court shall, unless the court finds extenuating circumstances, 
enter judgment for three times such profits or damages, whichever amount is 
greater, together with a reasonable attorney’s fee” for intentional use of a known 
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enactment, Congress explained that section 1117(b) 
authorized “mandatory or virtually mandatory awards of 
treble damages and attorney’s fees” in cases of intentional 
and “egregious conduct prohibited by existing law.”60  
“Narrower” than the Lanham Act provisions already in 
existence, section 1117(b) only displaced remedies available 
at the time of the enactment under the newly designated 
section 1117(a) to the extent they were “inconsistent with 
subsection (b).”61
All else being equal, [] a case involving a trademark’s 
intentional use by a defendant that knows the mark to be 
counterfeit certainly would qualify as an “exceptional” 
case under Lanham Act Section [1117](a).  But Congress 
made clear that, under new [1117](b), it would be even 
more exceptional for such a defendant to avoid the award 
of enhanced damages and attorneys’ fees by asserting the 
affirmative defense of extenuating circumstances.
  Considering the “exceptional” character of 
and discretionary power to award attorney’s fees under 
section 1117(a) and the intentional conduct requiring such an 
award under 1117(b), Richard Leighton notes that: 
62
More than a decade after the addition of 15 U.S.C. § 
1117(b), Congress further amended the Lanham Act to 
provide for statutory damages in trademark counterfeiting 
cases as an alternative to actual damages and profits.
 
63
[A] civil litigant may not be able to prove actual damages 
if a sophisticated, large-scale counterfeiter has hidden or 
destroyed information about his counterfeiting . . . .  
Moreover, counterfeiters’ records are frequently 
nonexistent, inadequate or deceptively kept in order to 
willfully deflate the level of counterfeiting activity actually 
engaged in, making proving actual damages in these cases 
extremely difficult if not impossible.
  
Before enactment of the amendment, Congress “recognize[d]” 
that: 
64
 
 
 
counterfeit mark) (emphasis added). 
 60. 130 CONG. REC. H12,076 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1984) (Joint Statement on 
Trademark Counterfeiting Legislation). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Leighton, supra note 50, at 865. 
 63. Anticounterfeiting Consumer Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
153, § 7, 110 Stat. 1386 (1996); 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c). 
 64. S. REP. NO. 104-177, at 10 (1995). 
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The amendment was enacted with the express purpose of 
“[e]nabling trademark owners to elect statutory damages . . . 
instead of actual damages”65 and the text of the statute itself 
provides that “the plaintiff may elect . . . to recover, instead of 
actual damages and profits under subsection (a) of this 
section, an award of statutory damages.”66  For ordinary 
counterfeiting cases, statutory damages may range from 
$1,000 to $200,000 “per counterfeit mark per type of goods or 
services sold, offered for sale, or distributed, as the court 
considers just.”67  In cases of “willful” trademark 
counterfeiting, the court may award damages of up to 
$2,000,000 “per counterfeit mark per type of goods or services 
sold, offered for sale, or distributed,” again as it “considers 
just.”68
2. Attorney’s Fees (and Presumptions of Willfulness) 
 
In addition to actual damages, profits, and costs, the 
Lanham Act also provides for the award of reasonable 
attorney’s fees under section 1117(a).  Congress included 
language allowing that “[t]he court in exceptional cases may 
award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.”69  
Congress enacted this provision in 1975 after the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier 
Brewing Co.70 in 1967.71
Before the Fleischmann decision, federal courts exercised 
what was thought to be an inherent power to award 
attorney’s fees in trademark infringement and unfair 
competition cases.  Courts exercised this power in the absence 
of a statutory grant of authority and contrary to the American 
  In Fleischmann, the Court held that 
attorney’s fees could not be awarded under the Lanham Act 
because Congress had not permitted such an award amongst 
the detailed remedial provisions in section 1117. 
 
 65. Id. (emphasis added) (“This section amends section 35 of the Lanham 
Act, allowing civil litigants the option of obtaining discretionary, judicially 
imposed damages in trademark counterfeiting cases, instead of actual damages. 
. . . Enabling trademark owners to elect statutory damages is both necessary 
and appropriate in light of the deception routinely practiced by counterfeiters.”). 
 66. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c). 
 67. Id. § 1117(c)(1). 
 68. Id. § 1117(c)(2). 
 69. Id. § 1117(a). 
 70. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714 (1967). 
 71. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-600, 88 Stat. 1955. 
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Rule, which makes such awards the exception and not the 
general rule, as is customary in English courts.72  For 
example, in Aladdin Mfg. Co. v. Mantle Lamp Co. of America, 
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that an award of 
attorney’s fees as compensatory damages was appropriate in 
certain trademark infringement and unfair competition cases 
where “willful and fraudulent conduct is sustained by the 
evidence.”73  Although the Lanham Act was enacted without 
an attorney’s fees provision, five years after Aladdin, federal 
courts relying on that decision continued to make such 
awards in “a virtually unbroken string of cases” involving 
willful trademark infringement and unfair competition 
brought under the Act.74
In Fleischmann, the Court granted certiorari to consider 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’s decision to reverse an 
attorney’s fees award.  The Ninth Circuit found that the 
Lanham Act did not grant federal courts the power to award 
attorney’s fees.
 
75  Reviewing the historical and precedential 
evolution of the American Rule, its justifications, and its 
exceptions, the Supreme Court found that the exceptions 
“were not . . . developed in the context of statutory causes of 
action [like the Lanham Act] for which the legislature had 
prescribed intricate remedies.”76  “[I]n the Lanham Act,” the 
Court continued, “Congress meticulously detailed the 
remedies available to a plaintiff who proves that his valid 
trademark has been infringed,” including injunctive relief and 
monetary relief in the form of plaintiff’s damages, defendant’s 
profits, and costs.77
 
 72. See Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796) (per curiam) (“We 
do not think that this charge [$1600 in attorney’s fees] ought to be allowed. The 
general practice of the United States is in opposition to it; and even if that 
practice were not strictly correct in principle, it is entitled to the respect of the 
court, till it is changed, or modified, by statute.”); Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. 
Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975) (“In the United States, the prevailing 
litigant is ordinarily not entitled to collect a reasonable attorneys’ fee from the 
loser.”). 
  The Court concluded by stating that 
“[w]hen a cause of action has been created by a statute which 
expressly provides the remedies for vindication of the cause, 
 73. Aladdin Mfg. Co. v. Mantle Lamp Co. of America, 116 F.2d 708, 716–17 
(7th Cir. 1941). 
 74. Leighton, supra note 50, at 857–58. 
 75. Fleishmann, 386 U.S. at 716. 
 76. Id. at 717–19. 
 77. Id. at 719. 
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other remedies should not readily be implied”78 and then all-
but invited Congress to explicitly provide for attorney’s fees 
under the Lanham Act by citing examples where it had done 
so in the Patent and Copyright acts, among others.79
Shortly after the Fleischmann decision, Congress set 
about restoring federal courts’ ability to award attorney’s fees 
in trademark cases.  In June 1973, Representative Robert W. 
Kastenmeier introduced a bill to amend the Lanham Act and 
provide for the same kind of attorney’s fees awards the 
Supreme Court denied in Fleischmann by adding a sentence 
to 15 U.S.C. § 1117 that reads (in its entirety): “The court in 
exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the 
prevailing party.”
 
80  The following month, the House 
Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Courts, Civil 
Liberties, and the Administration of Justice (chaired by 
Representative Kastenmeier) held a hearing where Rene 
Tegtmeyer, Acting Commissioner of Patents, was the lone 
witness.81  Commissioner Tegtmeyer testified that “equitable 
considerations” justified an exception to the American Rule 
presumptively denying attorney’s fees awards to prevailing 
parties in trademark suits and argued that successful parties 
“should be entitled to full compensation for injuries sustained 
and expenses incurred, since these were necessitated by the 
acts of the opposing party.”82
 
 78. Id. at 720 (citing Philp v. Nock, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 460 (1873); Teese v. 
Huntingdon, 64 U.S. (23 How.) 2 (1860); Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 
363 (1852)). 
  Contrary to fears that 
attorney’s fees might become “exorbitant” or difficult to 
calculate, Commission Tegtmeyer testified that they “may 
well be consequential and foreseeable, and judges and 
 79. Fleishmann, 386 U.S. at 720–21.  Associate Justice Potter Stewart, the 
lone dissenter, argued that it was “reasonable to assume that when Congress in 
the Lanham Act empowered courts to grant relief ‘subject to the principles of 
equity’ [15 U.S.C. § 1117(a)] it was aware of the Aladdin decision and intended 
to preserve the rule of that case.”  Id. at 722.  Absent an overruling of Aladdin 
by Congress, Justice Stewart would have allowed federal courts to continue to 
exercise their equitable powers to award attorney’s fees in Lanham Act cases 
upon a finding of willful trademark infringement or unfair competition.  Id. at 
723. 
 80. Patents-Filing Oppositions Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-600, 88 Stat. 
1955; 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2008). 
 81. Hearing on H.R. 7599, H.R. 8981, H.R. 9199, and S. 71 Before the 
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, & the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong. (1973). 
 82. Id. 
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masters are capable of determining reasonable fees.”83  
Echoing the Fleischmann Court’s opinion, Commissioner 
Tegtmeyer also cited the various federal statutes, including 
the Patent and Copyright acts, which expressly provided for 
attorney’s fees awards.84
At the hearing, Commission Tegtmeyer noted that the 
proposed amendment expressly limited attorney’s fee awards 
to “exceptional cases,” and that such awards were also 
discretionary.
 
85  Speaking on behalf of the Commerce 
Department,86 Commissioner Tegtmeyer testified that “[w]e 
understand the phrase ‘exceptional cases’ to permit recovery 
of attorney’s fees from infringers only where the acts of 
infringement might be characterized as ‘malicious,’ 
‘fraudulent,’ ‘deliberate’ or willful.”87
Commissioner Tegtmeyer also testified to the 
interrelationship of existing remedies under the Lanham Act 
with attorney’s fees awards: 
 
The Trademark Act currently provides for awarding treble 
damages in appropriate circumstances in order to 
encourage the enforcement of trademark rights.  The 
availability of treble damages, however, cannot be 
 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. The Patent Act’s attorney’s fees provision reads: “The court in 
exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.”  
35 U.S.C. § 285 (2014).  The Copyright Act provides: 
In any civil action under this title, the court in its discretion may allow 
the recovery of full costs by or against any party other than the United 
States or an officer thereof. Except as otherwise provided by this title, 
the court may also award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing 
party as part of the costs. 
17 U.S.C. § 505 (2014). 
 85. Hearing on H.R. 7599, H.R. 8981, H.R. 9199, and S. 71 Before the 
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, & the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong. 15 (1973) (statement of Hon. Rene Tegtmeyer, 
Acting Comm’r of Patents, Dep’t of Commerce).  
 86. Leighton notes that although “[t]he legislative history does not reveal 
whether the Commerce Department drafted H.R. 8981, [] that would not be 
surprising.”  Leighton, supra note 50, at 860.  H.R. 8981 was introduced at the 
Commerce Department’s request.  Hearing on H.R. 7599, H.R. 8981, H.R. 9199, 
and S. 71 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, & the Admin. of 
Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong. 1 (1973). 
 87. Hearing on H.R. 7599, H.R. 8981, H.R. 9199, and S. 71 Before the 
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, & the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong. 15 (1973) (statement of Hon. Rene Tegtmeyer, 
Acting Comm’r of Patents, Dep’t of Commerce).  Commissioner Tegtmeyer also 
noted that the proposed attorney’s fees provision “would also permit prevailing 
defendants to recover attorney fees in exceptional cases.”  Id. 
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regarded as a substitute for the recovery of attorney fees.  
In suits brought primarily to obtain an injunction, 
attorney fees may be more important than treble 
damages.  Frequently, in a flagrant case of infringement 
where the court action is instituted promptly, the 
measurable damages are nominal.  Nonetheless, attorney 
fees may be substantial.  The Trademark Act as 
amended . . . would make clear that a court has discretion 
as to whether to award attorney fees, treble damages, or 
both, or neither.88
The House Judiciary Committee Report promulgated 
following the hearing also stated that “[t]he attorney fee 
remedy should coexist with [the] existing provision for treble 
damages and attorney fees should also be available to 
defendants in exceptional cases.”
 
89
Both the House and Senate Judiciary Committees 
promulgated reports containing statements substantially 
similar to Commissioner Tegtmeyer’s testimony.
 
90
Section 3 provides that attorney fees may be awarded to 
the prevailing party in actions under the federal 
trademark laws, when equitable considerations justify 
such awards.  It would make a trademark owner’s remedy 
complete in enforcing his mark against willful infringers, 
and would give defendants a remedy against unfounded 
suits.
  Both 
reports’ sectional analyses stated that: 
91
The amendment adding attorney’s fees to the remedies 
available for trademark infringement under the Lanham Act 
became law in January 1975.
 
92  The House Report and the 
following Senate Report also stated that the amendment 
would authorize attorney’s fees awards “where justified by 
equitable considerations” and defined “exceptional” 
infringement cases as those “where the acts of infringement 
can be characterized as ‘malicious,’ ‘fraudulent,’ ‘deliberate,’ 
or ‘willful.’ ”93
 
 
 
 88. Id.  
 89. H.R. REP. NO. 93-524, at 2 (1973). 
 90. Id. at 2–6; S. REP. NO. 93-1400, at 2–6 (1974). 
 91. H.R. REP. NO. 93-524, at 6 (1973); S. REP. NO. 93-1400, at 6 (1974). 
 92. Patents-Filing Oppositions Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-600, 88 Stat. 
1955. 
 93. H.R. REP. NO. 93-524, at 1–2 (1973); S. REP. NO. 93-1400, at 1–2 (1974).  
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In December 2004 (following enactment of the ACPA and 
section 1117(d)), Congress further amended section 1117 to 
include a presumption of willful violation where a violator 
knowingly gives false information when registering a domain 
name.  Specifically, section 1117(e) provides that: 
In the case of a violation referred to in this section, it shall 
be a rebuttable presumption that the violation is willful 
for purposes of determining relief if the violator, or a 
person acting in concert with the violator, knowingly 
provided or knowingly caused to be provided materially 
false contact information to a domain name registrar, 
domain name registry, or other domain name registration 
authority in registering, maintaining, or renewing a 
domain name used in connection with the violation.  
Nothing in this subsection limits what may be considered 
a willful violation under this section.94
According to the House Judiciary Committee Report, this 
section creates a test to determine whether a violation within 
the ambit of section 1117 is “willful” and “ensures that only 
those who attempt to mask their identity in connection with 
another violation of the Trademark Act” will be subject to 
“the additional civil penalties that result from willful 
infringement,” absent the ability to offer evidence to rebut the 
presumption.
 
95
There is a textual overlap and thus an apparent tension 
between subsection (e) (knowingly providing materially false 
contact information in registering, maintaining, or renewing 
a domain name) and ACPA factor seven (providing material 
and misleading false contact information when applying for 
 
 
 94. Intellectual Property Protection and Courts Amendments Act of 2004, 
Pub. L. No. 108-482, 118 Stat 3912. 
 95. H.R. REP. NO. 108-536, at 3, 6–7 (2004).  Congress intended subsection 
(e) to establish a five-part test to determine whether a violation is willful (which 
does not appear in the text of the statute itself): 
(1) The domain name registration must be materially false. 
(2) The information must have been knowingly provided or knowingly 
caused to be provided. 
(3) The recipient of the information must be a domain name registrar, 
registry, or other domain name registration authority (such as ICANN 
or its successor). 
(4) The information must be provided for the purpose of registering, 
maintaining, or renewing a domain name. 
(5) The domain name must have been used in connection with a 
violation. 
Id. at 6. 
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the registration of the domain name).  However, it is 
important to note that subsection (e) establishes a rebuttable 
presumption of “willfulness,” not a rebuttable presumption of 
“bad faith intent to profit.”  This is consistent with Congress’s 
intent in creating the nonexclusive, nonexhaustive list of bad 
faith intent factors: 
[T]he fact that a defendant provided erroneous 
information in applying for a domain name registration or 
registered multiple domain names that were identical to, 
confusingly similar to, or dilutive of distinctive marks does 
not necessarily show bad-faith.  The Committee recognizes 
that such false information may be provided without a 
bad-faith intent to trade on the goodwill of another’s 
mark, and that there are likely to be instances in which 
multiple domain name registrations are consistent with 
honest business practices.  Similar caveats can be made 
for each of the eight balancing factors, which is why the 
list of factors is nonexclusive and nonexhaustive.96
Further, subsection (e) establishes a rebuttable 
presumption that the violation is willful “for purposes of 
determining relief,” not for purposes of initially determining 
whether the ACPA has been violated.  Thus, subsection (e) 
becomes significant for purposes of relief—including 
attorney’s fees—only after an ACPA violation is established.  
Subsection (e) may then be considered in determining 
whether or not a case is “exceptional” for purposes of 
attorney’s fees awards under subsection (a).
 
97
II. CIRCUIT SPLIT: STATUTORY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S 
FEES UNDER THE LANHAM ACT AND THE ACPA 
 
A recent circuit split highlights the uncertainty in 
deciding the first question this article attempts to answer: 
whether attorney’s fees are available under section 1117(a) to 
Lanham Act plaintiffs who seek statutory damages in place of 
actual damages and profits.  This Part provides an overview 
of the split by reviewing the relevant circuit court decisions 
and proceeds to argue not only that attorney’s fees are 
available to Lanham Act plaintiffs who elect to receive 
statutory damages for trademark counterfeiting violations 
 
 96. S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 9–10 (1999). 
 97. See infra Part III.B.3. 
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under section 1117(c) (as the Second Circuit has held), but 
that they are also available to ACPA plaintiffs who elect to 
receive statutory damages for cybersquatting violations under 
section 1117(d). 
A. Ninth Circuit – Electing to Receive Statutory Damages 
Precludes an Award of Both Treble Damages and Attorney’s 
Fees under the Lanham Act 
In December 2007, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
decided that an award of statutory damages for trademark 
counterfeiting under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c) precluded an award 
of attorney’s fees under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(b).98  The plaintiff, 
an aftermarket automotive accessory manufacturer and 
owner of two registered trademarks, filed suit against 
defendants alleging trademark infringement, counterfeiting, 
and dilution under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114 and 1125.99  In its 
complaint, plaintiff elected to receive statutory damages 
under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c).100  After the district court granted 
plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on all claims, it 
awarded $20,000 in statutory damages under 15 U.S.C. § 
1117(c)(1) and $100,000 in attorney’s fees under section 
1117(b).101
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that 
attorney’s fees could not be awarded when the plaintiff 
elected to receive statutory damages under section 1117(c) 
rather than actual damages under section 1117(a).  The court 
observed that under section 1117(a), a plaintiff seeking actual 
damages could be awarded attorney’s fees in “exceptional 
cases.”  Further, in cases involving counterfeit marks, under 
section 1117(b), a plaintiff could recover three times the 
actual damages recoverable under section 1117(a) plus 
reasonable attorney’s fees “in every case” in the absence of 
extenuating circumstances.  But under section 1117(c), a 
plaintiff that chooses to “eschew” actual damages under 
 
 
 98. K & N Eng’g v. Bulat, 510 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 99. Id. at 1080–81. 
 100. Id. at 1081. 
 101. Id. (“Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c)(1) and (b) respectively, the district 
court awarded K & N statutory damages of $20,000 and attorney’s fees of 
$100,000.”).  Under Section 1117(c), a plaintiff may elect to recover statutory 
damages “at any time before final judgment is rendered by the trial court.”  15 
U.S.C. § 1117(c) (2008). 
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section 1117(a) and seek statutory damages instead would 
not be awarded attorney’s fees or treble damages.102  The 
court noted that section 1117(c) “makes no provision for 
attorney’s fees; nor does section 1117(b) authorize such fees 
for a plaintiff seeking statutory damages under section 
1117(c).  Section 1117(b)’s attorney’s fees provision applies 
only in cases with actual damages under section 1117(a).”103  
Thus, because the plaintiff elected to receive statutory 
damages under section 1117(c) and because the district court 
“did not assess or award” actual damages under section 
1117(a), the court concluded that there was “no statutory 
basis to award . . . attorney’s fees under section 1117(b).”104
Notwithstanding language in the opinion strongly 
suggesting that an award of attorney’s fees in Lanham Act 
cases is tied to an award of actual damages under section 
1117(a) (or trebled actual damages under 1117(b)), the court 
expressly reserved “the issue whether an election to receive 
statutory damages under section 1117(c) precludes an award 
of attorney’s fees for exceptional cases under the final 
sentence of section 1117(a).”
 
105
B. Second Circuit – Electing to Receive Statutory Damages 
Does Not Preclude an Award of Attorney’s Fees under the 
Lanham Act 
  That question was answered 
in early 2012 in the Second Circuit. 
Unlike the Ninth Circuit, a recent Second Circuit 
decision concluded that attorney’s fees could be awarded 
where the plaintiff elects statutory damages.  In Louis 
Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Ly USA, Inc.,106 the famous French 
fashion house brought suit against defendants alleging 
trademark counterfeiting, infringement, and dilution and 
false designation of origin under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125(a), 
and 1125(c).107  In 2008, the district court granted plaintiff’s 
motion for summary judgment on its trademark 
counterfeiting and infringement claims.108
 
 102. K & N Eng’g, 510 F.3d at 1081–82. 
  Plaintiff requested 
 103. Id. at 1082. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 1082 n.5. 
 106. 676 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 107. Id. at 89. 
 108. Id. at 92–93. 
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the maximum statutory damages available under the 
Lanham Act in addition to attorney’s fees, costs, and 
investigative fees.109  Over defendants’s objections, the 
district court awarded plaintiff $3,000,000 in statutory 
damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c) and over $500,000 in 
attorney’s fees and costs under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).110  
Recognizing the typical availability of attorney’s fees in cases 
where actual damages, but not statutory damages, are 
awarded, the district court nonetheless found that attorney’s 
fees in addition to statutory damages were appropriate.111
On appeal, defendants argued that because the plaintiff 
elected to receive statutory damages under 15 U.S.C. § 
1117(c), plaintiff “waived” its ability to receive an award of 
attorney’s fees under section 1117(a).
 
112  Defendants relied on 
the text of the statute, reasoning that 15 U.S.C. §§ 1117(a) 
and (b) expressly provide for attorney’s fees awards and 
subsection (c) does not.113  Defendants also relied on a series 
of district court decisions finding that the election of statutory 
damages precludes an attorney’s fees award and on the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals’ ruling in K and N Engineering.114
The Second Circuit found the issue “plain”: does the 
choice to seek statutory damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c) 
“supplant” only “the method for ascertaining the amount of 
damages” under subsection (a) (leaving the provision 
regarding attorney’s fees in “exceptional cases” “unaffected”) 
or “the entirety” of section (a) (including the provision for 
attorney’s fees in “exceptional cases”)?
 
115
 
 109. Id. at 93–94. 
  In other words, does 
subsection (c) provide an alternative remedy to actual 
damages under subsection (a), or an alternative to all of the 
remedies provided in subsection (a)?  The court first noted the 
explicit disagreement in its district courts on this issue, as 
well as those instances where district courts either 
acknowledged the issue “without proffering an answer to it”; 
“avoid[ed] confronting the issue by implicitly or explicitly 
accounting for the cost of attorney’s fees in setting the 
 110. Id. at 94. 
 111. Id. at 104. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 104–05. 
 115. Id. at 106. 
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amount of the statutory-damages award”; or awarded 
attorney’s fees under subsection (a) and statutory damages 
under subsection (c) “without acknowledging the potential 
statutory hurdle they had to clear in doing so.”116
Turning to the decision in K & N Engineering, the Second 
Circuit noted that the Ninth Circuit recognized but did not 
resolve the issue in a “critically different” case where the 
plaintiff sought statutory damages and attorney’s fees under 
sections (c) and (b), and not, as in the present case, under 
sections (c) and (a).
 
117  The Second Circuit also noted a 
disagreement among commentators as to the availability of 
both statutory damages and attorney’s fees under sections 
1117(a) and (c).118
Engaging in its own analysis of the plain meaning of the 
statutory text, the Second Circuit first noted that section 
1117(a) distinguishes between a plaintiff’s recovery of actual 
damages, profits, and costs and a court’s “discretionary award 
of attorney’s fees in exceptional circumstances.”
 
119  The court 
went on to state that in the Second Circuit, “exceptional” 
cases necessarily involved trademark infringement that was 
“willful” or in “bad faith.”120  The text of section 1117(c), the 
court explained, allows plaintiffs to recover statutory 
damages “instead of actual damages and profits under 
subsection (a).”121
 
 116. Id. at 106–07. 
  Thus, given the distinction between the 
awards under subsection (a) and the provision under 
subsection (c) for statutory damages “instead of actual 
 117. Id. at 107–08.  The Second Circuit speculated that the plaintiffs in K & 
N Engineering might “have sought attorney’s fees under section 1117(b) rather 
than section 1117(a) because the former provides for an automatic grant of 
attorney’s fees together with damages, while the latter only provides for 
attorney’s fees in ‘exceptional cases,’ as discussed previously.”  Id. at 108.  
 118. Id. at 108. Cf. 4 Callmann on Unfair Competition, Trademarks and 
Monopolies § 23:67 (4th ed. 2011) (“[A] prevailing plaintiff who elects statutory 
damages under the Lanham Act in a counterfeiting case is not entitled to 
attorney’s fees.”) with 5 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 
30:95 n.9 (4th ed. 2012) (describing the Ninth Circuit’s K & N Engineering 
decision in the subsection (b) context as “a hyper-technical reading of the 
statute” and lamenting that it fails “to read Lanham Act § 35 as an integrated 
whole”)  
Id. (alteration in original). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at108–09 (citing Patsy’s Brand, Inc. v. I.O.B. Realty, Inc., 317 F.3d 
209, 221 (2d Cir. 2003)). 
 121. Id. at 109; 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c) (2008). 
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damages and profits under subsection (a),” awards of 
attorney’s fees in “exceptional cases” are “not foreclosed” in 
cases where a plaintiff elects to receive statutory rather than 
actual damages.122
Although the court found this interpretation of the 
statutory text “compelling” and concluded that “so long as the 
‘exceptional case’ requirement . . . is met, the text of sections 
1117(a) and 1117(c) leaves an award of attorney’s fees within 
the discretion of the district court,” two of the three judges 
acknowledged “at least some ambiguity” in the text and 
continued their analysis to consider the legislative history of 
and intent behind the enactment of section 1117(c).
 
123  The 
court first observed that, before enactment of the 
Anticounterfeiting Consumer Protection Act in 1996,124 
remedies for trademark infringement under the Lanham Act 
were limited to actual damages, profits, costs, and attorney’s 
fees “in exceptional cases” under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) and 
treble damages, reasonable attorney’s fees, and prejudgment 
interest in cases of willful counterfeiting under 15 U.S.C. § 
1117(b).125  Citing the Senate Judiciary Committee’s 1995 
report on the proposed legislation to add section (c), the court 
observed that “Congress appears to have been motivated by a 
gap in the law” that existed when successful plaintiffs in 
trademark counterfeiting suits were nonetheless “unable to 
obtain an adequate recovery in actual damages because 
counterfeiters often maintain sparse business records, if any 
at all.”126
 
 122. Ly, 676 F.3d at 109. 
  Further, the court explained that the present case 
exemplified the “gap” Congress recognized and attempted to 
fill by providing a statutory damages alternative in 
trademark counterfeiting suits, as the district court 
“concluded that the defendants were responsible for a 
‘massive counterfeiting enterprise’ based at least in part on 
 123. Id. at 109 n.26. 
 124. Anticounterfeiting Consumer Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
153, 110 Stat. 1386.  See supra notes 63–68 and accompanying text. 
 125. Ly, 676 F.3d at 110. 
 126. Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 104-177, at 10 (1995) (“The committee recognizes 
that under current law, a civil litigant may not be able to prove actual damages 
if a sophisticated, large-scale counterfeiter has hidden or destroyed information 
about his counterfeiting.  Moreover, counterfeiters’ records are frequently 
nonexistent, inadequate or deceptively kept in order to willfully deflate the level 
of counterfeiting activity actually engaged in, making proving actual damages 
in these cases extremely difficult if not impossible.”)). 
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plaintiff’s allegations and the unavailability of records 
suggesting otherwise.”127
Consistent with their analysis of the statutory text, the 
court concluded that the amendment to the Lanham Act 
adding subsection (c) “was thus apparently designed to 
provide an alternative to the type of recovery provided in 
section 1117(a); not to all of the remedies provided for in that 
section” and that the amendment “was meant to expand the 
range of remedies available to a trademark plaintiff, not 
restrict them.”
 
128  Given that remedial purpose, the court 
went on to state that it was “unlikely that Congress intended 
to prevent a plaintiff who opts to recover statutory damages 
from also receiving attorney’s fees,” especially given the lack 
of any evidence that Congress “intended a tradeoff between 
statutory damages and both actual damages and attorney’s 
fees” in the amendment’s legislative history.129  The court 
further opined that “it makes little sense . . . to further 
reward a defendant successful in defeating the plaintiff’s and 
the court’s attempts to fix the actual amount of damages by 
allowing him or her to avoid an award of attorney’s fees.”130  
The court then concluded that attorney’s fees awards are 
available in “exceptional cases” under section 1117(a) “even 
for those plaintiffs who opt to receive statutory damages 
under section 1117(c).”131
C. Evidence from the Legislative History of the Lanham Act – 
Electing to Receive Actual or Statutory Damages Does Not 
Preclude an Award of Attorney’s Fees 
 
In at least one respect, the Ninth and Second Circuit 
decisions summarized above do not represent a genuine 
circuit “split” as that term is usually understood.132
 
 127. Id. 
  After all, 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 110–11. 
 131. Id. at 111. 
 132. See, e.g., SUP. CT. R. 10 (“A petition for a writ of certiorari will be 
granted only for compelling reasons. The following, although neither controlling 
nor fully measuring the Court’s discretion, indicate the character of the reasons 
the Court considers: (a) a United States court of appeals has entered a decision 
in conflict with the decision of another United States court of appeals on the 
same important matter . . .”) (emphasis added); H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO 
DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 246–52 
(1991) (discussing circuit conflicts, or “splits,” as a criteria for determining 
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the issues before the two courts, as the Second Circuit 
recognized, were different.133  K and N Engineering involved 
construction of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1117(a) and (b): the former 
provides for awards of actual damages and profits, costs, and 
attorney’s fees in “exceptional cases” for trademark 
infringement (including counterfeiting) and the latter 
provides for treble damages and attorney’s fees for knowing 
trademark counterfeiting in the absence of “extenuating 
circumstances.”134
The Second Circuit’s decision in Ly, on the other hand, 
involved construction of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1117(a) and (c).
  Thus, although not necessarily self-
evident, the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that the two provisions 
“overlap,” making the election of damages under one 
preclusive of an award under the other, is both reasonable 
and logical. 
135  
Subsection (c) provides for statutory damages for trademark 
counterfeiting (as opposed to treble damages under 
subsection (b)) and does not separately provide for an 
attorney’s fees award (in either the presence or absence of 
“extenuating circumstances,” as under subsection (b)).136
This section provides additional support for the Second 
Circuit’s conclusion by incorporating other evidence from the 
legislative history of the attorney’s fees provision in 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1117(a)—which neither the Second nor the Ninth Circuit 
courts considered in their analyses—as a precursor to 
applying the Second Circuit’s construction of subsection (c) to 
subsection (d) (providing statutory damages in cybersquatting 
cases) in Part II-D below. 
  
Similar to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in K and N 
Engineering, then, the reasonable inferences drawn solely 
from the text of the statute suggest that the Ly decision 
reading the two subsections as interdependent and 
compatible is also reasonable and logical. 
1. Acknowledging the Textual Ambiguity in Section 1117 
As an initial matter, it must be acknowledged that some 
ambiguity exists in the text of section 1117 before proceeding 
 
“certworthiness”). 
 133. Ly, 676 F.3d at 107–08. 
 134. K & N Engineering v. Bulat, 510 F.3d 1079, 1082 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 135. Ly, 676 F.3d at 106. 
 136. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(b), (c) (2008). 
CUMBY FINAL 5/23/2014  12:41 PM 
2014] THE EXCEPTIONAL CYBERSQUATTER 331 
to consider additional legislative history.  If there were no 
ambiguity—if the statute “spoke for itself”—neither the 
Second Circuit’s analysis of the legislative history of section 
1117(c), nor the additional analysis of section 1117(a) offered 
in this paper, would be necessary or justified.137
A comparison of subsections (a), (b), (c), and (d) suggests 
there is at least some ambiguity
 
138 in the text of section 1117 
that requires recourse to extrinsic legislative materials to 
fully understand the appropriate application of the statute.  
Subsection (a) provides for actual damages, profits, costs, and 
attorney’s fees in “exceptional cases”139 for trademark 
infringement, including ordinary infringement, 
counterfeiting, unfair competition, and willful trademark 
dilution.140  Subsection (b) provides for treble damages for 
trademark counterfeiting “[i]n assessing damages under 
subsection (a)” and mandates attorney’s fees where no 
“extenuating circumstances” exist.141  Subsection (c), which 
provides statutory damages in trademark counterfeiting 
cases, references subsection (a) but includes no provision for 
attorney’s fees itself.142
 
 137. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 
(2005) (“As we have repeatedly held, the authoritative statement is the 
statutory text, not the legislative history or any other extrinsic material. 
Extrinsic materials have a role in statutory interpretation only to the extent 
they shed a reliable light on the enacting Legislature’s understanding of 
otherwise ambiguous terms.”).  This issue is particularly relevant here, as one of 
the three circuit judges empanelled to decide the issues presented in Ly believed 
that the text at issue was unambiguous and did not join in the court’s discussion 
of the legislative history of 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c).  Ly, 676 F.3d at 109 n.26.  
  Subsection (d), which provides 
statutory damages in cybersquatting cases, does not reference 
subsection (a) and also makes no provision for attorney’s 
 138. See, e.g., United States v. Shirey, 359 U.S. 255, 258 (1959) 
(“Awkwardness is not ambiguity, nor do defined multiple meanings . . . 
constitute a want of definiteness.”); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 93 (9th ed. 2009) 
(defining ambiguity as “[a]n uncertainty of meaning or intention, as in a 
contractual term or statutory provision.”). 
 139. A fuller discussion of the ambiguity inherent in these two words follows 
in Part III. 
 140. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (prescribing recovery for violations “under section 
1125(a) or (d) of this title, or a willful violation under section 1125(c) of this 
title”). 
 141. Id. § 1117(b). 
 142. Id. § 1117(c) (“In a case involving the use of a counterfeit mark . . . the 
plaintiff may elect, at any time before final judgment is rendered by the trial 
court, to recover, instead of actual damages and profits under subsection (a) of 
this section, an award of statutory damages”). 
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fees.143
The Second Circuit noted that “[t]he fact that section 
1117(b) expressly provides for attorney’s fees arguably 
indicates that section 1117(c)’s lack of an attorney’s fee 
provision reflects an intent not to allow the award of fees in 
statutory-damages cases.”
 
144  The same implication could be 
drawn from the lack of an attorney’s fees provision in section 
1117(d), particularly given the marked similarity of the text 
of both sections.145
In addition, it should be noted that the legislative history 
of 15 U.S.C. § 1117 considered here is discrete and not 
“murky, ambiguous, and contradictory” such that it is a 
suspect source of clarification on this particular point.
 
146  
Thankfully, the relevant legislative histories are short (the 
ACPA went from introduction to enactment in less than six 
months) and, in many instances, repetitive147 and therefore 
not amenable to the sort of “cherry picking” that make some 
excursions into extrinsic materials especially “vulnerable . . . 
to criticism.”148
 
 143. Id. § 1117(d) (“In a case involving a violation of section 1125(d)(1) of this 
title [the ACPA], the plaintiff may elect, at any time before final judgment is 
rendered by the trial court, to recover, instead of actual damages and profits, an 
award of statutory damages”). 
 
 144. Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Ly USA, Inc., 676 F.3d 83, 109 n.25 (2d 
Cir. 2012). 
 145. See infra notes 165–67 and accompanying text (comparing (c) and (d)). 
 146. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005) 
(noting that“[n]ot all extrinsic materials are reliable sources of insight into 
legislative understandings, however, and legislative history in particular is 
vulnerable to two serious criticisms. First, legislative history is itself often 
murky, ambiguous, and contradictory. . . .  Second, judicial reliance on 
legislative materials like committee reports, which are not themselves subject to 
the requirements of Article I, may give unrepresentative committee members—
or, worse yet, unelected staffers and lobbyists—both the power and the 
incentive to attempt strategic manipulations of legislative history to secure 
results they were unable to achieve through the statutory text.”). 
 147. See supra Part I.A–B. 
 148. Exxon Mobil, 545 U.S. at 568 (noting that “[j]udicial investigation of 
legislative history has a tendency to become, to borrow Judge Leventhal’s 
memorable phrase, an exercise in ‘looking over a crowd and picking out your 
friends.’ ” ).  Given the size of the legislative history here and the light it sheds 
on the text, the author respectfully submits that the crowd is small and mostly 
made up of friends. 
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2. The Textual Ambiguity Can Be Resolved by 
Considering the Legislative History of Both 
Sections (a) and (c) 
Analyzing the text of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1117(a) and (c), the 
Second Circuit observed that the latter’s provision of 
statutory damages “instead of actual damages and profits 
under subsection (a)” meant that it was “a carveout for part of 
the remedy otherwise available under section 1117(a): ‘actual 
damages and profits.’ ”149  Thus, the election of statutory 
damages under subsection (c) did not “supplant the entirety 
of subsection (a) including the provision for attorney’s fees in 
‘exceptional cases.’ ”150
In analyzing the legislative history of subsection (c) (but 
not subsection (a)), the court concluded that this textual 
reading was entirely consistent with Congress’s intent to 
remedy a “gap” in the law created when actual damages are 
difficult to prove (given counterfeiters’ deliberate or negligent 
record keeping) by enacting an alternative, statutory 
damages provision.
 
151  The court also rejected the notion that 
Congress intended to create an alternative remedy to all of 
the remedies provided for in subsection (a) (including 
attorney’s fees), particularly given the remedial nature of the 
statute, or to restrict the remedies available to plaintiffs in 
trademark infringement cases.152
Additionally, the legislative history of section (a)’s 
attorney’s fees remedy provides additional support for these 
conclusions that was not considered by the Second Circuit.  
First, Commissioner Tegtmeyer’s testimony at the only 
hearing in which the amendment providing for attorney’s fees 
was considered heavily emphasized the “equitable 
considerations” justifying an exception to the American Rule, 
as well as successful parties’ entitlement to “full 
compensation for injuries sustained and expenses incurred” 
in trademark infringement cases.
 
153
 
 149. Ly, 676 F.3d at 109 (emphasis added). 
  This equitable emphasis 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 110 n.27 (quoting S. REP. NO. 104-177, at 10 (1995)). 
 152. Id. at 110 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 104-556 (1996); S. REP. NO. 104-177 
(1995)).  
 153. Hearing on H.R. 7599, H.R. 8981, H.R. 9199, and S. 71 Before the 
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, & the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong. 14 (1973) (statement of Hon. Rene Tegtmeyer, 
Acting Comm’r of Patents, Dep’t of Commerce). 
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was reiterated in both the House and Senate reports that 
followed the hearing.154
Commissioner Tegtmeyer also emphasized the 
discretionary nature of attorney’s fees awards in this context 
and their limitation to exceptional cases.
 
155  Both of these 
considerations were key to the Second Circuit’s comparison of 
subsections (a), (b), and (c) and its rejection of the idea that 
the express provision of attorney’s fees in section (b) and the 
omission of the same in section (c) “reflects an intent not to 
allow the award of fees in statutory-damages cases.”156
The fact that both sections 1117(a) and 1117(b) specifically 
allow for attorney’s fees suggests that section 1117(c) also 
allows for them, especially in light of the purpose of that 
subsection, and that it does so by retaining the 
“exceptional case” provision of section 1117(a).  The 
attorney’s fee provisions of sections 1117(a) and (b) differ 
in an important respect: the former is subject to the 
“exceptional case” requirement, and is therefore 
discretionary, while the latter is mandatory.
  
Conversely, the court reasoned that: 
157
Importantly, Commissioner Tegtmeyer and the House 
and Senate reports on the bill also noted that attorney’s fees 
awards were meant to be an additional—rather than an 
alternative—remedy that, with others, were meant to afford 
trademark infringement plaintiffs complete relief.  
Commissioner Tegtmeyer specifically testified that awards of 
treble damages under subsection (a)
 
158
 
 154. H.R. REP. NO. 93-524, at 1, 2, 6 (1973); S. REP. NO. 93-1400, at 1, 2, 6 
(1974). 
 “cannot be regarded as 
a substitute for the recovery of attorney fees,” particularly 
“[i]n suits brought primarily to obtain an injunction” where 
“attorney fees may be more important than treble damages” 
because the suits are “instituted promptly,” actual damages 
 155. Hearing on H.R. 7599, H.R. 8981, H.R. 9199, and S. 71 Before the 
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, & the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong. 15 (1973) (statement of Hon. Rene Tegtmeyer, 
Acting Comm’r of Patents, Dep’t of Commerce). 
 156. Ly, 676 F.3d at 109 n.25. 
 157. Id. 
 158. “In assessing damages the court may enter judgment, according to the 
circumstances of the case, for any sum above the amount found as actual 
damages, not exceeding three times such amount.”  15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2008).  
The treble damages under subsection (a) and those available under the later-
enacted subsection (b) are, of course, distinguishable. 
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are therefore “nominal,” but “attorney fees may be 
substantial.”159  Commissioner Tegtmeyer went on to state 
that “[t]he Trademark Act as amended . . . would make clear 
that a court has discretion as to whether to award attorney 
fees, treble damages, or both, or neither.”160  The House 
Report also noted that attorney’s fees awards should “coexist” 
with existing remedies under section 1117.161  Finally, both 
the House and Senate reports reasoned that attorney’s fees 
awards “would make a trademark owner’s remedy complete 
in enforcing his mark against willful infringers.”162
This history is important as the inability to substitute 
treble damages available under subsection (a) for attorney’s 
fees strongly suggests that statutory damages (under either 
subsection (c) or (d)) are similarly not a substitute for 
attorney’s fees.  Both treble damages and statutory damages 
are remedies responsive to the unique facts of a case whose 
calculation is committed to the discretion of the trial court.  
Subsection (a) provides that “[i]n assessing damages the court 
may enter judgment, according to the circumstances of the 
case, for any sum above the amount found as actual damages, 
not exceeding three times such amount.”
 
163  Similarly, 
subsections (c) and (d) provide for a range of statutory 
damages as an alternative to actual damages and profits in 
cases where calculation of the latter is difficult (if not 
impossible).164
All of the considerations underlying the addition of an 
attorney’s fees provision in subsection (a)—the equitable 
nature of attorney’s fees awards; the discretionary power to 
make attorney’s fees awards only in “exceptional cases”; the 
character of attorney’s fees awards as an additional, rather 
than alternative, remedy; and their purpose in providing 
complete relief—are consistent with the considerations the 
Second Circuit surveyed in analyzing subsection (c), and that 
consistency provides further support to the court’s conclusion 
 
 
 159. Hearing on H.R. 7599, H.R. 8981, H.R. 9199, and S. 71 Before the 
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, & the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong. 15 (1973) (statement of Hon. Rene Tegtmeyer, 
Acting Comm’r of Patents, Dep’t of Commerce). 
 160. Id. 
 161. H.R. REP. NO. 93-524, at 2 (1973). 
 162. Id. at 6; S. REP. NO. 93-1400, at 6 (1974). 
 163. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). 
 164. See id. § 1117(c), (d). 
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that Congress intended attorney’s fees awards to accompany 
awards of statutory damages in “exceptional cases.” 
D. Attorney’s Fees are Available in “Exceptional Cases” under 
the ACPA Where the Plaintiff Elects to Receive Statutory 
Damages, Just as in “Exceptional Cases” Where the Plaintiff 
Elects to Receive Actual Damages 
In light of the Second Circuit’s decision and its discussion 
of the legislative history of subsection (c), as well as the 
discussion of the legislative history behind subsection (a) 
presented here, this paper now turns to a discussion of the 
text and legislative history of subsection (d) to argue that 
attorney’s fees are available in “exceptional cases” when a 
cybersquatting plaintiff elects to receive statutory damages 
under subsection (d).  As noted before, the text of subsections 
(c) and (d) are substantially similar.  Subsection (c) reads: 
In a case involving the use of a counterfeit mark (as 
defined in section 1116(d) of this title) in connection with 
the sale, offering for sale, or distribution of goods or 
services, the plaintiff may elect, at any time before final 
judgment is rendered by the trial court, to recover, instead 
of actual damages and profits under subsection (a) of this 
section, an award of statutory damages for any such use in 
connection with the sale, offering for sale, or distribution 
of goods or services in the amount of— 
(1) not less than $1,000 or more than $200,000 per 
counterfeit mark per type of goods or services sold, offered 
for sale, or distributed, as the court considers just; or 
(2) if the court finds that the use of the counterfeit mark 
was willful, not more than $2,000,000 per counterfeit 
mark per type of goods or services sold, offered for sale, or 
distributed, as the court considers just.165
Subsection (d) reads: 
 
In a case involving a violation of section 1125(d)(1) of this 
title, the plaintiff may elect, at any time before final 
judgment is rendered by the trial court, to recover, instead 
of actual damages and profits, an award of statutory 
damages in the amount of not less than $1,000 and not 
more than $100,000 per domain name, as the court 
 
 165. Id. § 1117(c) (emphasis added). 
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considers just.166
Identical language in both subsections provides that “the 
plaintiff may elect, at any time before final judgment is 
rendered by the trial court, to recover, instead of actual 
damages and profits . . . an award of statutory damages . . . as 
the court considers just.”  Importantly, the text of both 
subsections is clear that statutory damages sought under 
either are available as an alternative to actual damages and 
profits, arguably leaving the opportunity to recover attorney’s 
fees under subsection (a) in place. 
 
The same conclusion is reached when one applies the 
Second Circuit’s textual analysis to a case where a 
cybersquatting plaintiff elects to receive statutory damages 
for a violation of the ACPA under subsection (d) and seeks to 
recover attorney’s fees under subsection (a).  Subsection (a) 
distinguishes between awards of actual damages and profits 
in cybersquatting cases generally and awards of attorney’s 
fees in “exceptional” cybersquatting cases, and subsection (d) 
is a carveout for the former in cases where a plaintiff elects to 
receive statutory damages “instead” of actual damages and 
profits.  Further, nothing in subsection (d) (unlike subsection 
(b)) hampers the court’s discretion in awarding attorney’s fees 
in “exceptional cases” when statutory damages are chosen as 
an alternative remedy.167
Given the substantial similarity between subsections (c) 
and (d), as well as the minor differences in their texts (most 
significantly subsection (c)’s express reference to subsection 
(a), a reference subsection (d) does not include), it is 
reasonable to assume the same ambiguity that may be found 
in the former is also present in the latter, making recourse to 
the legislative history of the ACPA appropriate in an effort to 
better understand Congress’s intent in providing statutory 
damages relief in cybersquatting cases. 
 
First, it should be noted that with the exception of the 
first version of the ACPA, later supplanted by substitute 
 
 166. Id. § 1117(d) (emphasis added). 
 167. As a textual matter, this conclusion holds notwithstanding the explicit 
reference to subsection (a) in subsection (c) and the omission of a similar 
reference in subsection (d).  Both subsections provide for statutory damages 
“instead of actual damages and profits,” and no provision other than subsection 
(a) is implicated as no other provision under section 1117 (or the Lanham Act) 
provides for “actual damages and profits.” 
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legislation, the only mention of attorney’s fees awards in the 
legislative history of the ACPA is with respect to a trademark 
plaintiff’s misrepresentation regarding domain name 
infringement: 
Under the amended bill, a trademark owner who 
knowingly and materially misrepresents to the domain 
name registrar or registry that a domain name is 
infringing is liable to the domain name registrant for 
damages, including costs and attorneys’ fees, resulting 
from the suspension, cancellation, or transfer of the 
domain name.168
In fact, when the ACPA was amended to replace the 
original text with substitute legislation, Senator Abraham, 
the ACPA’s original sponsor, neglected to mention that the 
attorney’s fees provision would be omitted from the substitute 
legislation, along with the original bill’s provision for criminal 
penalties (which did, for some reason, warrant mention).
 
169
The omission of any substantive discussion of attorney’s 
fees in the legislative history of the ACPA is, like all silences, 
subject to interpretation.  Notably, the legislative history of 
subsection (c) is also silent on the matter of attorney’s fees.  
Thus, again noting the similarity in the text of the two 
sections, it would be reasonable to conclude either that (1) 
Congress intended for attorney’s fees to be available alongside 
statutory damages under both sections and did not feel the 
need to include an express provision for attorney’s fees, given 
the provision already included in subsection (a); or (2) 
Congress did not intend for attorney’s fees to be available 
alongside statutory damages under either section. 
 
 
 168. S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 11 (1999).  This provision is codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1114(2)(D)(iv) (“If a registrar, registry, or other registration authority takes an 
action described under clause (ii) based on a knowing and material 
misrepresentation by any other person that a domain name is identical to, 
confusingly similar to, or dilutive of a mark, the person making the knowing 
and material misrepresentation shall be liable for any damages, including costs 
and attorney’s fees, incurred by the domain name registrant as a result of such 
action. The court may also grant injunctive relief to the domain name 
registrant, including the reactivation of the domain name or the transfer of the 
domain name to the domain name registrant.”). 
 169. See Cybersquatting and Consumer Protection: Ensuring Domain Name 
Integrity: Hearing on S. 1255 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 
2 (1999) (statement of  Sen. Spencer Abraham) (“A number of suggestions have 
convinced me of the need for substitute legislation which addresses the issue of 
in rem jurisdiction and which eliminate provisions dealing with criminal 
penalties.”). 
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First, the latter conclusion is at odds with Congress’s 
express intention to allow defendants to recover attorney’s 
fees where plaintiff trademark owners “overreach.”  
Notwithstanding the special solicitude for potential 
defendants subject to that overreach, including the clear 
intention to provide them relief in the form of attorney’s fees, 
it is nonsensical to assume that Congress meant to afford 
greater relief to defendants fallen victim to plaintiffs’ 
overreach than to plaintiffs fallen victim to defendants’ 
trademark infringement. 
Second, it is significant that from the very beginning the 
ACPA was intended to “supplement[] existing rights under 
trademark law,”170 and the statutory damages provision that 
would become subsection (d) was seen as an alternative to 
actual damages and profits under then-existing subsection 
(a).171  Also, the ACPA was intended “to provide adequate 
remedies for trademark owners” in cybersquatting cases,172 
allowing them to seek “traditional” remedies, such as 
injunctions, actual damages, statutory damages, profits, and 
costs.173  Consistent not only with tradition,174 but with 
existing remedies available under the Lanham Act, both the 
Senate and House reports made clear that “the creation of a 
new section [defining and prohibiting cybersquatting] in the 
Trademark Act does not in any way limit the application of 
current provisions of trademark, unfair competition and false 
advertising or dilution law, or other remedies under 
counterfeiting or other statutes, to cybersquatting cases.”175
Thus, given this legislative history background, it seems 
that the Second Circuit’s reasoning as to Congress’s intent in 
providing for statutory damages in trademark counterfeiting 
cases in addition to attorney’s fees in “exceptional cases” 
similarly applies to the statutory damages provision in 
cybersquatting cases.  In cybersquatting cases, just as in 
 
 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at 3 (“Finally, this [substitute] legislation provides for statutory civil 
damages . . . The plaintiff may elect these damages in lieu of actual damages or 
profits at any time before final judgment.”). 
 172. S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 8 (1999).   
 173. Id. at 16; see also H.R. REP. NO. 106-412, at 15 (1999). 
 174. It should be noted that before the Court’s decision in Fleishmann, 
“traditional” remedies for willful trademark infringement included attorney’s 
fees.  See supra notes 72–74 and accompanying text. 
 175. S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 16 (1999); H.R. REP. NO. 106-412, at 14 (1999). 
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trademark counterfeiting cases, alleged cybersquatters are 
presumably no more or less prone to keep accurate business 
records that might form the basis of an actual damages or 
profits award.  Moreover, given the availability of injunctive 
relief in cybersquatting cases, actual damages (including 
treble damages) and profits may be very little, but attorney’s 
fees could be substantial. 
It is also clear that Congress intended to provide a host of 
“traditional” remedies to trademark owners in cybersquatting 
cases, so the notion that the election of statutory damages 
instead of actual damages and profits forecloses the 
availability of attorney’s fees “in exceptional cases” is 
unsound, if not directly contrary to that intent. 
The legislative history of subsection (a) also supports this 
conclusion because, in exceptional cases, the court was 
intended to have discretionary power to award equitable 
remedies.  Additionally, the notion that attorney’s fees 
awards are an additional, rather than alternative, remedy 
and that their purpose is to assist in providing complete relief 
are consistent with both the text and the legislative history of 
subsection (d). 
Consistent with the text and the legislative history of 
both subsections (a) and (d), cybersquatting plaintiffs who 
elect to receive statutory damages under the latter provision 
should also be able to recover attorney’s fees under the former 
in “exceptional cases.”  But what is an “exceptional case” in 
the context of the Lanham Act and who is the “exceptional 
cybersquatter” in the specific context of the ACPA?  This 
paper now turns to a discussion of these questions and 
advances a definition of the latter in an attempt to provide 
more clarity to this narrow but confusing area of the law 
governing damages in trademark cases. 
III. WHO IS THE EXCEPTIONAL CYBERSQUATTER? 
This part attempts to clarify when a defendant 
cybersquatter whose “bad faith intent to profit” is established 
under the ACPA176
 
 176. This analysis assumes that the other elements of an ACPA violation—
plaintiff’s ownership of the mark and defendant’s registration, trafficking, or 
use of a domain name that is identical or confusingly similar to the mark; the 
distinctiveness of the mark; and the inapplicability of the safe harbor 
provisions—are satisfied.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1) (2012); Mamiya America 
 may be ordered by the court to pay the 
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plaintiff’s attorney’s fees upon a finding that the case is 
exceptional.  Again, the court’s discretionary power to award 
attorney’s fees “in exceptional cases” is not implicated here, 
because the threshold finding of “exceptionality” is not itself 
discretionary and will be reviewed for clear error.177
Although this necessary/sufficient distinction may seem 
obvious in some respect, several cases
  Thus, 
although a “bad faith intent to profit” is necessary to a finding 
of “exceptionality” that then permits a court to exercise its 
discretion in making an attorney’s fees award to the plaintiff, 
it is not sufficient to render a case “exceptional” given a 
complete definition of that term. 
178
 
Corp. v. HuaYi Brothers, Inc., No. 09 CV 5501, 2011 WL 1322383, at *4 
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2011). 
 where the distinction 
has been both blurred and observed are useful in distilling 
three key principles that together help to define “the 
exceptional cybersquatter”: (1) “bad faith intent to profit” 
alone does not make a case exceptional; (2) a cybersquatter’s 
 177. See, e.g., Newport News Holdings Corp. v. Virtual City Vision, Inc., 650 
F.3d 423, 441 (4th Cir. 2011); Procter & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 280 F.3d 
519, 528 (5th Cir. 2002).  But see Lahoti v. Vericheck, Inc., 636 F.3d 501, 505 
(9th Cir. 2011) (“We . . . review de novo whether a trademark case is exceptional 
under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a)”).  The burden is on the party seeking an award of 
attorney’s fees to establish that the case is “exceptional.”  See, e.g., Schlotzsky’s, 
Ltd. v. Sterling Purchasing & Nat’l Distrib. Co., Inc., 520 F.3d 393, 402 (5th Cir. 
2008); Bd. of Supervisors for La. State Univ. Agric. & Mech. Coll. v. Smack 
Apparel Co., 550 F.3d 465, 491 (5th Cir. 2008) (“The prevailing party bears the 
burden of demonstrating the exceptional nature of the case by clear and 
convincing evidence.”). 
 178. Many of the cases here were decided in the federal district courts and 
although they represent only persuasive authority, the conduct of the trial 
courts is important as many cybersquatting cases are adjudicated on motions 
for default judgment where the factual allegations contained in the plaintiff’s 
complaint are deemed admitted.  See FED. R. CIV. PROC. 8(b)(6) (“An 
allegation—other than one relating to the amount of damages—is admitted if a 
responsive pleading is required and the allegation is not denied.”); Prot. One 
Alarm Monitoring, Inc. v. Exec. Prot. One Sec. Serv., LLC., 553 F. Supp. 2d 201, 
207–08 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (“In the Complaint, plaintiff alleges that Executive 
Protection One’s use of the Protection One mark was willful. . . . As discussed 
above, a default requires that the factual allegations in the complaint be 
accepted as true and plaintiff plead the necessary facts for willful infringement. 
Therefore, defendant’s violations are deemed willful and thus constitute 
exceptional circumstances. An award of reasonable attorney’s fees is thus 
appropriate.”).  For obvious reasons, entries of default judgment are not often 
appealed.  Also, as discussed below, at least one circuit court of appeals 
conflates the discretion to award attorney’s fees in “exceptional cases” with the 
discretion to decide whether cases are “exceptional” in the first instance.  See, 
Audi AG v. D’Amato, 469 F.3d 534, 551 (6th Cir. 2006).   
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litigation misconduct, that is, conduct separable from any 
conduct violative of the Lanham Act or the ACPA, may make 
a case exceptional; and (3) a cybersquatter’s willful conduct in 
violation of the Lanham Act or the ACPA may also make a 
case exceptional. 
It should be noted that these three categories are not 
neatly discrete or mutually exclusive, and that conduct 
demonstrating “bad faith intent to profit” may also 
demonstrate “willfulness,” in which case the cybersquatting is 
“exceptional.”179  Similarly, the facts of a particular case may 
establish (1) “bad faith intent to profit,” (2) litigation conduct 
that amounts to abuse of process, and (3) willfulness within 
the meaning of the Lanham Act.180
A. What is an “Exceptional Case”? 
  However, as many of the 
cases below demonstrate, facts establishing “bad faith intent 
to profit” and those found to make a case “exceptional” are too 
often confused.  In response, this paper attempts to offer a 
classification that fully realizes the distinction between the 
two standards in an attempt to define the truly “exceptional 
cybersquatter.” 
The attorney’s fees provision of the Lanham Act provides 
that courts may award reasonable attorney’s fees to the 
prevailing party “in exceptional cases.”  Thus, for a party to 
receive an attorney’s fees award, it must prevail, the case 
must be “exceptional,” and the court must then exercise its 
discretion to make such an award.  But what is an 
“exceptional case”? 
The “jumble” of case law defining “exceptional cases” 
under the Lanham Act has received searching scrutiny by 
both courts and commentators.181
 
 179. See Stephen W. Boney, Inc. v. Boney Servs. Inc., 127 F.3d 821, 827 (9th 
Cir. 1997) (“ ‘ [B]ad faith of one of the parties may be part of those exceptional 
circumstances’ warranting a fee award”) (alterations omitted). 
  Confusion on this point 
 180. See, e.g., Emp’rs Council On Flexible Comp. v. Feltman, 384 F. App’x 
201, 207–08 (4th Cir. 2010) (finding “ample support” for the district court’s 
determination that the defendants’ conduct was “exceptional” when they copied 
plaintiff’s marks to “cause[] consternation in the ranks” and compete directly 
against the plaintiff (“willful” conduct) and that one of the defendants 
“conducted minimal legal research” on the trademark issues involved in the 
case (litigation conduct)).  See also discussion infra Part III.B. 
 181. See, e.g., Nightingale Home Healthcare, Inc. v. Anodyne Therapy, LLC, 
626 F.3d 958 (7th Cir. 2010); Leighton, supra note 50. 
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comes from the lack of any definition in the Lanham Act itself 
and the fact that the only definition provided in the 
legislative history of the attorney’s fees provision of 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1117(a) is a brief but cryptic list of “descriptors”: an 
exceptional case is one in which the defendant’s infringing 
activity is “ ‘ malicious,’ ‘fraudulent,’ ‘deliberate,’ or 
‘willful.’ ” 182
Leighton opines that “the disjunctive form used by 
Congress indicates that each of these descriptors is meant to 
mean different things; on the other hand, Congress may have 
been deliberately redundant to capture varying judicial 
descriptors of the same type of activity.”
 
183
What follows is a brief survey of several Courts of 
Appeals’ definitions of “exceptional cases” in and out of the 
cybersquatting context that sets the stage for this paper’s 
proposed definition of the “exceptional cybersquatter.”
  In either case, 
many circuit courts of appeals define exceptionality by 
including, either along with “ ‘ malicious,’ ‘fraudulent,’ 
‘deliberate,’ or ‘willful,’ ”  or independently of them, “bad faith” 
conduct.  In some jurisdictions, conduct that does not rise to 
the level of “bad faith” is nonetheless sufficient to render a 
case “exceptional.” 
184
In the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Tenth, Eleventh, and 
District of Columbia Circuits, if the prevailing plaintiff 
demonstrates that the defendant acted in “bad faith,” the case 
may be, but is not necessarily, “exceptional” within the 
 
 
 182. Hearing on H.R. 7599, H.R. 8981, H.R. 9199, and S. 71 Before the 
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, & the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong. 15 (1973); H.R. REP. NO. 93-524, at 1, 2 (1973); S. 
REP. NO. 93-1400, at 1, 2 (1974).  
 183. Leighton, supra note 50 at 866–67. 
 184. Both Nightingale and Leighton collect and categorize cases based on 
both the circuits’ definitions of “exceptional” and how that definition applies to a 
“prevailing party,” whether plaintiff or defendant.  Because the issue here—the 
exceptionality of cybersquatters in cases where the bad faith of the defendant is 
already established as a substantive requirement under the ACPA—is not 
presented when a plaintiff engages in bad faith conduct (because there is no 
“doubling down” on bad faith as an element of both the ACPA violation and 
“exceptionality”), the collection and categorization here is simpler.  Similarly, 
the validity of “dual standards” for determining exceptionality under the 
Lanham Act in light of Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994) (rejecting 
the application of different standards to prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing 
defendants in determining the availability of attorney’s fees awards under the 
Copyright Act) is beyond the scope of this paper.  See Leighton, supra note 50 at 
875–76. 
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meaning of the Lanham Act.185  Such a case is determined 
exceptional and an award of attorney’s fees is permitted at 
the discretion of the district court.186  Addressing the meaning 
of “exceptional cases” in the specific context of the ACPA, the 
Fourth Circuit found that “a bad faith finding under the 
ACPA does not compel a finding of malicious, fraudulent, 
willful or deliberate behavior under section 1117.”187  In 
People for Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney,188 the 
court concluded that “the district court was within its 
discretion to find that, even though Doughney violated the 
ACPA (and, thus, acted in bad faith), he did not act with the 
level of malicious, fraudulent, willful or deliberate behavior 
necessary for an award of attorney fees.”189
The Sixth Circuit appears to closely follow the legislative 
history behind the Lanham Act’s attorney’s fees provision, 
 
 
 185. Patsy’s Brand, Inc. v. I.O.B. Realty, Inc., 317 F.3d 209, 221–22  (2d Cir. 
2003) (“The Lanham Act authorizes the award of attorney’s fees to prevailing 
parties in ‘exceptional cases,’ 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a), which we have understood to 
mean instances of ‘fraud or bad faith.’ ” ) (citing Twin Peaks Productions v. 
Publications International, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1383 (2d Cir. 1993)); Scotch 
Whisky Ass’n v. Majestic Distilling Co., Inc., 958 F.2d 594, 599 (4th Cir. 1991) 
(stating that under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a), a case is “exceptional” if the defendant’s 
conduct was “malicious, fraudulent, willful or deliberate in nature” and that a 
prevailing plaintiff must “show that the defendant acted in bad faith”); Tex. Pig 
Stands, Inc. v. Hard Rock Cafe Int’l, Inc., 951 F.2d 684, 697 (5th Cir. 1992); 
Procter & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 280 F.3d 519, 526 (5th Cir. 2002); Nat’l 
Ass’n of Prof’l Baseball Leagues, Inc. v. Very Minor Leagues, Inc., 223 F.3d 
1143, 1147 (10th Cir. 2000); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Safeway Disc. Drugs, 
Inc., 675 F.2d 1160, 1169 (11th Cir. 1982); Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc. v. 
Conservative Digest, Inc., 821 F.2d 800, 808 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“Under the 
Lanham Act, a court must find willful or bad faith infringement by the 
defendant in order to award attorney’s fees to the plaintiff.”). 
 186. Patsy’s Brand, 317 F.3d at 221–22 (“The Lanham Act authorizes the 
award of attorney’s fees to prevailing parties in ‘exceptional cases,’ 15 U.S.C. § 
1117(a), which we have understood to mean instances of ‘fraud or bad faith’ ”) 
(citing Twin Peaks, 996 F.2d at 1383); Scotch Whisky, 958 F.2d at 599 (stating 
that under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a), a case is “exceptional” if the defendant’s conduct 
was “malicious, fraudulent, willful or deliberate in nature” and that a prevailing 
plaintiff must “show that the defendant acted in bad faith”); Tex. Pig 
Stands, 951 F.2d at 697; Procter & Gamble, 280 F.3d at 526; Prof’l Baseball 
Leagues, 223 F.3d at 1147; Safeway Stores, 675 F.2d at 1169; Reader’s Digest, 
821 F.2d at 808 (“Under the Lanham Act, a court must find willful or bad faith 
infringement by the defendant in order to award attorney’s fees to the 
plaintiff.”). 
 187. People for Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359, 370 
(4th Cir. 2001). 
 188. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359. 
 189. Id. at 370. 
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eschewing the inclusion of “bad faith” along with “‘malicious,’ 
‘fraudulent,’ ‘deliberate,’ or ‘willful’” in its general definition 
of “exceptional.”190  However, the Sixth Circuit is unique 
among all of the federal courts of appeals—it explicitly 
suggested all cybersquatting cases may be “exceptional” by 
stating that “[a] finding of bad faith under the ACPA does not 
necessarily compel a court to find ‘malicious, fraudulent, 
willful or deliberate’ conduct.  However, a court would be well 
within its discretion in determining that bad faith under the 
ACPA supports finding such conduct.”191
This statement is remarkable in its lack of qualification.  
As I argue below, a court would not be “well within its 
discretion in determining that bad faith under the ACPA 
supports a finding” of “malicious, fraudulent, willful, or 
deliberate” conduct in the absence of conduct in some way 
separable from that which establishes bad faith intent under 
the ACPA; otherwise, all ACPA cases are “exceptional” (which 
also means none of them are).  Further, the determination 
that a case is “exceptional” based on a finding of “malicious, 
fraudulent, willful, or deliberate” conduct is not discretionary, 
it is a factual determination reviewed for clear error.  Instead, 
it is the award of attorney’s fees once a case has been 
determined to be “exceptional” that is discretionary.  
However, to the extent that the Sixth Circuit recognizes 
conduct may establish both “bad faith intent to profit” and 
exceptionality, the conclusion is correct but relies on an 
incomplete and misleading statement of the law. 
 
Uniquely, the Seventh Circuit appears to equate 
“exceptionality” with a broad definition of “abuse of 
process.”192
 
 190. Eagles, Ltd. v. Am. Eagle Found., 356 F.3d 724, 728 (6th Cir. 2004) (“the 
term “exceptional” is not defined in the statute, although a case is not 
exceptional unless ‘the infringement was malicious, fraudulent, willful, or 
deliberate.’ ”) (quoting Hindu Incense v. Meadows, 692 F.2d 1048, 1051 (6th Cir. 
1982)).  
  Under this theory, a defendant who “insist[s] on 
mounting a costly defense” is indistinguishable from a 
plaintiff who brings a trademark infringement case “not in 
order to obtain a favorable judgment, but instead to burden 
the defendant with costs likely to drive it out of the 
 191. Audi AG v. D’Amato, 469 F.3d 534, 551 (6th Cir. 2006). 
 192. Nightingale Home Healthcare, Inc. v. Anodyne Therapy, LLC, 626 F.3d 
958, 963–64 (7th Cir. 2010). 
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market.”193  Thus, a showing that a defense is “objectively 
unreasonable,” in the sense that it was meant to “impose 
disproportionate costs” on the plaintiff, is sufficient to show 
the case is “exceptional.”194
The First, Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits do not 
require a showing of “bad faith” in order for a case to be 
exceptional.
 
195  “Willfulness short of bad faith” and mere 
“culpable conduct” (including bad faith, fraud, malice, and 
knowing infringement) are sufficient in the First, Third, and 
Eighth circuits to render a case exceptional, and the Ninth 
Circuit expressly does not require a showing of bad faith.196
The Third Circuit has also separately addressed the 
meaning of “exceptional” in the cybersquatting context.  In 
Shields v. Zuccarini,
 
197
 
 193. Id. at 963. 
 a case decided shortly after the 
enactment of the ACPA, the district court made the requisite 
finding of culpable conduct when it determined that the 
defendant “acted willfully and in bad faith when he registered 
. . . domain names in an effort to confuse people and to divert 
 194. Id. at 965. 
 195. Tamko Roofing Prods., Inc. v. Ideal Roofing Co., 282 F.3d 23, 32 (1st Cir. 
2002) (“willfulness short of bad faith or fraud will suffice when equitable 
considerations justify an award and the district court supportably finds the case 
exceptional”); Ferrero U.S.A., Inc. v. Ozak Trading, Inc., 952 F.2d 44, 47–48 (3d 
Cir. 1991) (“a district court must make a finding of culpable conduct on the part 
of the losing party, such as bad faith, fraud, malice, or knowing infringement, 
before a case qualifies as ‘exceptional.’ ”); Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v. 
Securacom, Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 280 (3d Cir. 2000) (under the Lanham Act, 
attorney’s fees are available in “exceptional cases” which involve culpable 
conduct, such as “bad faith, fraud, malice, or knowing infringement.”) (citing 
Ferrero, 952 F.2d 44); Hartman v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 833 F.2d 117, 123 (8th 
Cir. 1987) (“Bad faith is not a prerequisite to a Lanham Act fee award.”); Cmty. 
of Christ Copyright Corp. v. Devon Park Restoration Branch of Jesus Christ’s 
Church, 634 F.3d 1005, 1013–14 (8th Cir. 2011) (stating that a district court is 
not “required to find the existence of bad faith before it could deem the case 
exceptional.”); Stephen W. Boney, Inc. v. Boney Servs., Inc., 127 F.3d 821, 
827 (9th Cir. 1997); Love v. Associated Newspapers, Ltd., 611 F.3d 601, 615–16 
(9th Cir. 2010). 
 196. Green v. Fornario, 486 F.3d 100, 101 (3d Cir. 2007) (“the term 
‘exceptional’ is not, as the plaintiff seems to suggest, a throwaway. Rather, it 
calls for a district court to determine whether it finds a defendant’s conduct 
particularly culpable—enough to alter the general American rule that parties to 
litigation pay their own attorneys’ fees.”); see also Tamko, 282 F.3d 23; Ferrero, 
952 F.2d 44; Securacom, 224 F.3d 273; Hartman, 833 F.2d 117; Cmty. of Christ, 
634 F.3d 1005; Boney, 127 F.3d 821; Love, 611 F.3d 601. 
 197. Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476, 487 (3d Cir. 2001). 
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Internet traffic to his web sites for his own economic gain.”198  
The district court also found that the defendant “conducted no 
bona fide business related to [plaintiff’s mark] and that he 
had no basis on which to believe his use of the domain names 
was fair and lawful.”199  Further, the district court found the 
defendant’s conduct to be “particularly flagrant” based on his 
registration of 1,644 domain names during the course of the 
pending litigation and noted that defendant “showed no 
remorse for his actions.”200
The Third Circuit noted that although “bad faith” was “a 
threshold finding for any violation of the ACPA . . . the 
district court made a proper finding that, under the 
circumstances, this case qualified as ‘exceptional’ and merited 
the award of attorney’s fees under § 1117(a).”
 
201  Significantly, 
the court of appeals explicitly reserved the question of 
“whether the finding of ‘bad faith’ under [the ACPA] 
automatically warrants an award of attorney’s fees under § 
1117(a) and the case law that has interpreted that 
provision.”202
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has found that willful 
conduct and a pattern or practice of cybersquatting, as well as 
“abusive litigation practices” in the course of cybersquatting 
litigation, can render a case “exceptional.”  In Lahoti v. 
Vericheck, Inc.,
 
203 the district court found that the defendant 
not only willfully registered a domain name substantially 
similar to plaintiff’s mark, “attempt[ed] to extort thousands of 
dollars” from plaintiff, and disregarded plaintiff’s trademark 
rights, he also engaged in a pattern and practice of 
cybersquatting and a pattern and practice of “abusive 
litigation practices,” including “the submission of inaccurate 
answers to interrogatories.”204
Of course, attorney’s fees awards under section 1117(a) 
are not mandatory, as they are under section 1117(b).  Thus, 
a successful plaintiff in a cybersquatting case, having 
established “bad faith intent to profit,” can still be denied an 
 
 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. at 487 n.7. 
 201. Id. at 487. 
 202. Id. at 487 n.6. 
 203. Lahoti v. Vericheck, Inc., 636 F.3d 501, 510–11 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 204. Id. 
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award of attorney’s fees in the district court’s discretion even 
if the court is bound by circuit precedent acknowledging that 
bad faith may serve as a prerequisite to such an award.205  
However, as Leighton points out, “the determination of 
exceptionality under Lanham Act Section 35(a) is a two-step 
analysis, the first step of which entails an objective inquiry 
that applies the statutory intent and related case law to the 
relevant facts as a precondition to the second step, namely, 
exercising the discretionary authority granted in the 
section . . . the initial inquiry is not, in itself, a discretionary 
act.”206  Thus, “focusing on discretion begs the question of how 
a trial court should determine whether the case before it is an 
‘exceptional’ one in which to exercise such discretion.”207  This 
distinction is important because the discretionary grant is 
necessarily limited.  Just as it would be inappropriate for a 
district court to award attorney’s fees in a case that was not 
exceptional,208
 
 205. See, e.g., People for Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 
359, 370 (4th Cir. 2001) (“a bad faith finding under the ACPA does not compel a 
finding of malicious, fraudulent, willful or deliberate behavior under § 1117. 
The district court was within its discretion to find that, even though [the 
defendant] violated the ACPA (and, thus, acted in bad faith), he did not act with 
the level of malicious, fraudulent, willful or deliberate behavior necessary for an 
award of attorney fees.”); Mister Softee of Brooklyn, Inc. v. Boula Vending Inc., 
484 F. App'x 623, 624 (2d Cir. 2012) (“While we have said that a finding of 
willfulness, fraud, or bad faith is a ‘prerequisite’ to finding a case ‘sufficiently 
“exceptional” to warrant an award of fees’ under section 1117(a) . . . we have 
never held that a finding of willfulness, fraud, or bad faith automatically 
requires an award of fees under that section.”) (quoting Louis Vuitton Malletier 
S.A. v. Ly USA, Inc., 676 F.3d 83, 108–09 (2d Cir. 2012)). 
 it would similarly be inappropriate for a 
district court not to award attorney’s fees in a case that was 
patently exceptional given Congress’s intent to provide 
 206. Leighton, supra note 50, at 866; see also Green v. Fornario, 486 F.3d 
100, 103–04 (3d Cir. 2007) (“Determining whether a case is exceptional is a two-
step process. First, the District Court must decide whether the defendant 
engaged in any culpable conduct.  We have listed bad faith, fraud, malice, and 
knowing infringement as non-exclusive examples of the sort of culpable conduct 
that could support a fee award.  Moreover, the culpable conduct may relate not 
only to the circumstances of the Lanham Act violation, but also to the way the 
losing party handled himself during the litigation.  Second, if the District Court 
finds culpable conduct, it must decide whether the circumstances are 
“exceptional” enough to warrant a fee award.  In sum, a district court may not 
award fees without a finding of culpable conduct, but it may decline to award 
them despite a finding of culpable conduct based on the totality of the 
circumstances.”) (citations omitted). 
 207. Leighton, supra note 50, at 866. 
 208. Id. 
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complete relief for trademark owners under the various 
provisions of the Lanham Act. 
B. The Exceptional Cybersquatter Defined 
This paper argues that defining the “exceptional 
cybersquatter” requires a principled distinction between what 
facts demonstrate “bad faith intent to profit” (that is, facts 
that define a “cybersquatter”) under the ACPA and what facts 
are sufficient to render a case “exceptional” under the 
Lanham Act.  Although it is important to recognize that the 
two inquiries can involve the same facts, all too often courts 
analyze those facts under one standard (“bad faith intent to 
profit”) and then assume the application of the other 
(“exceptional cases”).  This paper argues that that assumption 
is clearly erroneous, and that for any cybersquatting case to 
be truly “exceptional,” in addition to a finding that there is 
bad faith intent to profit, there must also be a finding that 
the defendant either engaged in conduct during the course of 
litigation that warrants the exercise of the discretion to 
award attorney’s fees or engaged in conduct that qualifies as 
“willful” within the meaning of the Lanham Act. 
Critically, the definition of the exceptional cybersquatter 
proposed here—“bad faith intent to profit” plus extraordinary 
litigation or infringement conduct—does not apply to cases 
that merely involve claims of cybersquatting.  Defining the 
exceptional cybersquatter as such is different than defining 
exceptional cybersquatting cases.  Thus, a case where 
attorney’s fees are sought against a defendant whose 
cybersquatting counterclaim is allegedly meritless is beyond 
the scope of this paper because the alleged cybersquatter in 
that case—the plaintiff—is the party seeking attorney’s fees 
rather than the party against whom attorney’s fees are 
sought.209
 
 209. See AirFX.com v. AirFX, LLC, No. CV 11-01064-PHX-FJM, 2013 WL 
857976, at *3 (D. Ariz. Mar. 7, 2013) (“because we find that defendant’s 
counterclaims [for trademark infringement and cybersquatting] were 
groundless and unreasonable, we conclude that this case is exceptional within 
the meaning of 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a)”). 
  In this scenario, there is no need to define the 
exceptional cybersquatter because it is not the alleged 
cybersquatter (the plaintiff) whose “exceptional” conduct is at 
issue; it is the defendant’s litigation conduct that warrants an 
attorney’s fees award. 
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1. Facts Underlying the Determination of “Bad Faith 
Intent to Profit” Alone Do Not Make a Case 
Exceptional 
At the outset, bad faith generally (as distinguishable 
from “bad faith intent to profit”) cannot support the 
determination that a case is “exceptional” for two reasons.  
First, there is no support for the use of “bad faith” as a 
descriptor for exceptional conduct in the legislative history of 
the Lanham Act’s attorney’s fees provision—the two words 
are never used, either in conjunction with or independent of 
the often-repeated definition of “exceptional cases,” that is, 
those exhibiting “malicious, fraudulent, deliberate, or willful” 
conduct.210  Second, as Leighton notes and the cases surveyed 
here demonstrate, “bad faith” is not capable of a precise 
definition and is therefore understandably defined and 
applied inconsistently by the courts.211
As noted above, the ACPA includes nine factors to guide 
courts in determining the existence of “bad faith intent to 
profit,” one of the essential elements of a cybersquatting 
claim.  The factors are permissive and in “unique 
circumstances,” courts are permitted to go beyond the factors 
to examine the facts of a case as a whole in deciding whether 
  This paper argues 
that generalized bad faith as a judicially-created, amorphous 
descriptor of “exceptional” conduct is entirely at odds with the 
text, intent, and purpose of both the Lanham Act’s attorney’s 
fees provision and the ACPA, and should not be used in 
determining what cases brought under the latter are 
“exceptional.” 
 
 210. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 93-524, at 1, 2 (1973); S. REP. NO. 93-1400, at 1, 
2 (1974); Leighton, supra note 50, at 881 (“The term ‘bad faith’ . . . does not 
appear (as such) in the statute or its legislative history.”). 
 211. Leighton, supra note 50, at 881 (“In Lanham Act cases (and elsewhere), 
‘bad faith’ invariably is unexplained, or explained by case-specific illustration 
only, rather than being the subject of a generally recognized definition.  In 
decisions that interpret the exceptional cases provision, the ‘bad faith’ 
descriptor is viewed inconsistently among the federal circuits. Thus, for 
example, some courts simply require a demonstration of ‘willfulness or bad 
faith,’ indicating that the terms are different but of equal culpability when 
applied to an action.  Some indicate that bad faith is of greater culpability than 
willfulness alone.  Some state that ‘willful’ and ‘bad faith’ are to be regarded 
merely as synonyms.”) (citing Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc. v. Conservative Digest, 
Inc., 821 F.2d 800, 808–09 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Tamko Roofing Prods., Inc. v. Ideal 
Roofing Co., 282 F.3d 23, 32 (1st Cir. 2002); Nightingale Home Healthcare, Inc. 
v. Anodyne Therapy, LLC, 626 F.3d 958, 960 (7th Cir. 2010)). 
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an alleged cybersquatter has the requisite intent.212
The first task in defining the “exceptional cybersquatter” 
is clearly defining what he is not—a mere cybersquatter.  In 
other words, facts supporting a finding of “bad faith intent to 
profit” alone are insufficient to also support a finding that a 
case is exceptional.  Otherwise, all cybersquatting cases 
would be exceptional, and the extraordinary, exceptional 
relief provided for in the Lanham Act’s attorney’s fees 
provision would cease to be either extraordinary or 
exceptional in all cases brought under the ACPA.  As there is 
no evidence whatsoever in the text or the legislative history of 
the ACPA or the Lanham Act justifying such a result, courts 
must be careful to distinguish cases involving “run of the 
mine” cybersquatters from cases involving truly exceptional 
cybersquatters.  Although making this distinction is 
seemingly intuitive, it appears to be difficult in practice. 
 
One of the most recent cases to expressly address the 
issue of “exceptionality” in cases where defendant’s bad faith 
is already established as an element of plaintiff’s 
cybersquatting claim is ForeWord Magazine, Inc. v. 
OverDrive, Inc.213  The plaintiff in ForeWord, a provider of 
book review services and publisher of a magazine called 
Foreword Reviews, owned the trademarks FOREWORD and 
FOREWORD REVIEWS.214  It entered into an agreement 
with defendant, an e-book software provider, to develop, 
distribute, and sell on-line book reviews.215  With the 
plaintiff’s consent, defendant registered the domain names 
forewordreviews.com and, to “head off consumer confusion 
from misspellings,” forwardreviews.com.216
The parties’ joint venture ended acrimoniously, and as 
part of a settlement agreement, defendant agreed to transfer 
forewordreviews.com to plaintiff.
 
217
 
 212. See Sporty’s Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman’s Mkt. Inc., 202 F.3d 489 (2d Cir. 
2000); Gioconda Law Grp. PLLC v. Kenzie, 941 F. Supp. 2d 424 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
  Defendant retained 
forwardreviews.com, which was not included in the parties’ 
settlement agreement, and for several years the domain name 
went unused until defendant rerouted Internet traffic from it 
 213. ForeWord Magazine, Inc. v. OverDrive, Inc., No. 1:10-CV-01144, 2013 
WL 140195 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 10, 2013). 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. 
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to its own website.218  When plaintiff learned that 
forwardreviews.com was still in use and directing traffic to 
defendant’s website, the parties entered into discussions 
regarding the domain name’s transfer.219  At one point, 
defendant offered to transfer forwardreviews.com to plaintiff 
in exchange for a $2,500 donation to charity.220  Plaintiff 
rejected this offer and threatened to sue defendant if the 
domain name was not transferred.221  Defendant’s CEO 
responded to this threat by temporarily rerouting traffic to 
forwardreviews.com to the website of Forward, a Jewish daily 
newspaper.222  Plaintiff later brought cybersquatting, unfair 
competition, and breach of contract claims against defendant 
under the ACPA and Michigan state law.223  On summary 
judgment, the court found in favor of the plaintiff on its 
cybersquatting claim, and after trial it turned to the issue of 
attorney’s fees.224
The court began its analysis of the attorney’s fees issue 
by revisiting its decision, on summary judgment, that 
defendant had acted in bad faith “as an element of [plaintiff’s] 
cybersquatting claim.”
 
225  Citing Sixth Circuit precedent, the 
court stated that a case is not “exceptional” under the 
Lanham Act unless the infringement at issue is “malicious, 
fraudulent, willful, or deliberate,” but that a finding of bad 
faith under the ACPA was sufficient to support a 
determination that a case is “exceptional” and justify an 
award of attorney’s fees.226  The court’s findings on summary 
judgment, however, went “further.”227
(1) Registration of a confusingly similar domain name for 
purposes of its joint venture with plaintiff (“to head off 
consumer confusion from misspellings”); 
  Specifically, the court 
reached the “inescapable conclusion” that defendant acted in 
bad faith because of its: 
 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. (The court ultimately ordered transfer of the domain name 
forwardreviews.com to plaintiff, in addition to attorney’s fees under the ACPA). 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. 
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(2) Failure to use the confusingly similar domain name for 
any legitimate business following the dissolution of the 
joint venture; 
(3) Re-routing of visitors to its own site, using the 
“overlap” between the two companies’ “somewhat different 
products and services” in “an attempt to increase 
[defendant’s] own business using [plaintiff’s] unwitting, 
potential” customers; 
(4) Re-routing of visitors to “forward.com” with “an intent 
to confuse [plaintiff’s] potential customers by linking the 
book-review company to a Jewish daily newspaper”; 
(5) “[R]efusal to simply give the [confusingly similar] 
domain name to [plaintiff] in exchange for its registration 
costs, even though it had no real connection to and no 
legitimate use for the domain name” [a refusal the court 
stated “smacks of bad faith”]; 
(6) Offer to transfer the confusingly similar domain name 
“in exchange for a $2,500 donation to a charity associated 
with [defendant’s] CEO”; and 
(7) Refusal “to return the domain name not out of any 
legitimate business purpose, nor based on any reasonable 
legal arguments that it was not in fact violating the law” 
but as “ ‘a matter of principle’  . . . opposing [plaintiff] at 
every turn.”228
Each of these findings “maps” onto factors set out in the 
ACPA for consideration in determining bad faith intent to 
profit.  First, (7) “the lack of any reasonable legal arguments 
that [defendant] was not in fact violating the law” suggests 
that defendant had no trademark or other intellectual 
property rights in the domain name—the first ACPA bad 
faith intent factor.
 
229
 
 228. Id. 
  Similarly, defendant had never used the 
domain name in connection with the bona fide offering of any 
 229. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(B)(i)(I) (2012) (“In determining whether a person 
has a bad faith intent described under subparagraph (A), a court may consider 
factors such as, but not limited to . . . the trademark or other intellectual 
property rights of the person, if any, in the domain name.”).  Lack of reasonable 
arguments that a defendant is not in fact in violation of the ACPA also suggest 
that the safe harbor provisions of the ACPA do not apply and, possibly, that 
defendant engaged in the kind of “abuse of process” that the court in 
Nightingale found sufficient to render a case “exceptional.”  See Nightingale 
Home Healthcare, Inc. v. Anodyne Therapy, LLC, 626 F.3d 958, 963–65 (7th 
Cir. 2010). 
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goods or services ((2), ACPA factor three230) and later, 
following the dissolution of the parties’ joint business venture, 
defendant intentionally diverted plaintiff’s “unwitting, 
potential” customers in an attempt to confuse them and 
increase its business ((3) and (4), ACPA factor five231).  
Defendant also offered to transfer or sell the domain name to 
plaintiff for financial gain without having used it in 
commerce itself ((5) and (6), ACPA factor six232) and acquired 
the domain name in the first instance, as the court points out, 
knowing that it was confusingly similar to plaintiff’s 
trademark ((1), ACPA factor eight233
Addressing defendant’s arguments that attorney’s fees 
were improper, including the simplicity of the case, plaintiff’s 
lack of actual damages, and defendant’s efforts to settle the 
matter, the court stated that: 
). 
[I]f anything, the simplicity of this case cuts against 
[defendant], which continued to refuse to transfer the 
name to [plaintiff] even after the issues and relevant law 
became clear.  The lack of actual damages, for its part, is 
also not a reason to find this case unexceptional . . . [and] 
attempts to settle a case cannot excuse the willful and 
 
 230. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(B)(i)(III) (“In determining whether a person has a 
bad faith intent described under subparagraph (A), a court may consider factors 
such as, but not limited to . . . the person’s prior use, if any, of the domain name 
in connection with the bona fide offering of any goods or services.”). 
 231. Id. § 1125(d)(B)(i)(V) (“In determining whether a person has a bad faith 
intent described under subparagraph (A), a court may consider factors such as, 
but not limited to . . . the person’s intent to divert consumers from the mark 
owner’s online location to a site accessible under the domain name that could 
harm the goodwill represented by the mark, either for commercial gain or with 
the intent to tarnish or disparage the mark, by creating a likelihood of confusion 
as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of the site.”). 
 232. Id. § 1125(d)(B)(i)(VI) (“In determining whether a person has a bad faith 
intent described under subparagraph (A), a court may consider factors such as, 
but not limited to . . . the person’s offer to transfer, sell, or otherwise assign the 
domain name to the mark owner or any third party for financial gain without 
having used, or having an intent to use, the domain name in the bona fide 
offering of any goods or services, or the person’s prior conduct indicating a 
pattern of such conduct.”). 
 233. Id. § 1125(d)(B)(i)(VIII) (“In determining whether a person has a bad 
faith intent described under subparagraph (A), a court may consider factors 
such as, but not limited to . . . the person’s registration or acquisition of multiple 
domain names which the person knows are identical or confusingly similar to 
marks of others that are distinctive at the time of registration of such domain 
names, or dilutive of famous marks of others that are famous at the time of 
registration of such domain names, without regard to the goods or services of 
the parties.”). 
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deliberate infringement that made the case necessary in 
the first place. 
Based on these facts and this reasoning, the court 
concluded that the case was “exceptional” and awarded 
attorney’s fees. 
This case is illustrative of the line-drawing problem 
inherent in defining the exceptional cybersquatter.  Where 
does conduct that “smacks of bad faith” for purposes of 
determining cybersquatter liability under the ACPA cross the 
line and become “malicious, fraudulent, willful, or deliberate” 
for purposes of awarding attorney’s fees under the Lanham 
Act?  From this perspective, the court’s analysis in this case is 
at least confusing and at most critically flawed.234
First, the court’s statement that a finding of bad faith is 
sufficient to render a case exceptional, although consistent 
with Sixth Circuit precedent, is incorrect.  If that were true, 
all cybersquatting cases would be exceptional, and thus none 
would be.  Further, even assuming the intellectual validity of 
such a proposition, findings of exceptionality are fact findings 
reviewed for clear error, although awards of attorney’s fees 
“in exceptional cases” are discretionary and reviewed for 
abuse of discretion.  Thus, the deferentially-reviewed decision 
to award attorney’s fees is within the discretion of the court 
only after the court has correctly determined, as a factual 
matter, that the case is “exceptional.”
 
235
Given precedent permitting confusion of the two 
standards, it is understandable but still remarkable for the 
purposes of this paper that the court determines the case is 
“exceptional” by looking at facts that map onto factors set out 
in the ACPA for consideration in determining bad faith intent 
 
 
 234. For another, similar Sixth Circuit decision, see HER, Inc. v. Re/Max 
First Choice, LLC, No. C2-06-492, 2011 WL 6019438 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 1, 2011).  
As in ForeWord, the facts the HER court uses to justify its “exceptionality” 
determination map onto factors Congress set out for courts to consider in 
determining whether bad faith intent exists under the ACPA.  See also 
Citigroup, Inc. v. Chen Bao Shui, 611 F. Supp. 2d 507, 512–13 (E.D. Va. 2009) 
(methodically analyzing the facts of the case according to the bad faith intent 
elements listed in the ACPA and concluding that the plaintiff had established 
the defendant’s ACPA violation, but merely stating that “Defendant’s violative 
use has been established as sufficiently willful, deliberate, and performed in bad 
faith to merit the maximum statutory award of $100,000 and an award of 
attorneys’ fees.”). 
 235. See, e.g., K.S.R. X-Ray Supplies, Inc. v. Se. X-Ray, Inc., No. 09-81454-
CIV, 2010 WL 4317026 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 25, 2010). 
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to profit.  Although it may be that the court relied implicitly 
on defendant’s “spitefulness” in determining that its 
infringement in this case was “willful and deliberate” and 
thus “exceptional,” the overwhelming weight of the reasoning 
in the opinion combined with the misstatement of the 
relevant standard at the head of the court’s discussion 
strongly indicates that the behavior here is indicative of 
nothing more than “bad faith intent to profit” and that the 
defendant is therefore no more than a cybersquatter as 
defined in the ACPA. 
This overlapping, misapplication of the two standards—
“bad faith intent to profit” and “exceptional cases”—is not 
uncommon and, as ForeWord shows, not unique to cases 
where attorney’s fees requests (or liability under the ACPA) 
are uncontested.236
2. Litigation Conduct May Make a Cybersquatter 
Exceptional 
  However, for the two standards to remain 
distinct, analysis like that in ForeWord—analysis that relies 
on the same facts to determine “bad faith intent to profit” and 
exceptionality without recognizing the distinction between 
the two—must be avoided. 
Notwithstanding the potential overlap between 
definitions of “bad faith intent to profit” and malicious, 
fraudulent, deliberate, and willful conduct generally, there 
are cases where defendants’ conduct in the course of litigation 
itself goes beyond the elements of “bad faith intent to profit” 
and courts recognizing this conduct appropriately and 
justifiably use it as a foundation for a finding of 
exceptionality.  This litigation conduct generally takes two 
forms: a pattern or practice of abusive discovery or litigation 
 
 236. See, e.g., Two Plus Two Pub., LLC v. Boyd, No. 2:09-CV-02318-KJD, 
2012 WL 724678 (D. Nev. Mar. 1, 2012) (analyzing bad faith intent under the 
ACPA factors and summarily finding defendant’s conduct willful without 
reference to facts not included in that analysis).  Even in uncontested cases, 
where willfulness is inferred from a defendant’s failure to appear, some courts 
still fail to distinguish between bad faith intent and exceptional conduct in their 
analyses.  See, e.g., Nucal Foods, Inc. v. Kaye, No. 2:12-CV-2754 KJM AC, 2013 
WL 1680643 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2013) (concluding that “because the defendant’s 
conduct can be deemed willful and deceptive in light of his failure to defend this 
action, in combination with his demand for payment [ACPA factor six], plaintiff 
is entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees.”) (emphasis added); City of Carlsbad v. 
Shah, 850 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1106 (S.D. Cal. 2012). 
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conduct and default, or the failure to defend. 
A pattern or practice of abusive discovery or litigation 
conduct is often the basis for courts’ findings of an 
“exceptional” case where attorney’s fees awards may be 
appropriate.  For instance, in City of Carlsbad v. Shah,237 the 
district court determined “bad faith intent to profit” from a 
series of stipulated facts, then went on to find that 
defendant’s “infringement was malicious, fraudulent, 
deliberate and willful.”238
Shah knowingly, intentionally and deliberately adopted 
and used the City’s Marks in order to cause confusion.  
Shah has persisted in using the City’s Logo in connection 
with his business enterprise even after the summary 
judgment ruling that established the City’s rights in the 
Marks and the Logo.  Shah has no good faith basis for 
refuting the City’s ownership of the Marks and Logo, and 
his arguments and behavior throughout this case have 
been groundless, unreasonable, vexatious, and pursued in 
bad faith.
 
239
The use of affirmative litigation behavior as a foundation 
for any “exceptional case” determination is not only consistent 
with a principled separation of the “bad faith intent to profit” 
and “exceptional” standards, but also with the Seventh 
Circuit’s attempt to standardize the definition of the 
“exceptional case” generally.  In Nightingale, Judge Posner 
asserted that “a case under the Lanham Act is ‘exceptional,’ 
in the sense of warranting an award of reasonable attorney’s 
 
 
 237. Shah, 850 F. Supp. 2d at 1108–09. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. (emphasis added); see also Lahoti v. Vericheck, Inc., 636 F.3d 501, 
510–11 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding that defendant’s infringement was willful 
because he knowingly registered plaintiff’s mark as a website address, tried to 
extort thousands of dollars from the plaintiff, had a pattern and practice of 
cybersquatting, and had a pattern of abusive discovery and litigation conduct); 
Mine O’Mine, Inc. v. Calmese, No. 2:10-CV-00043-KJD, 2012 WL 1279827, at *3 
(D. Nev. Apr. 16, 2012), aff’d, 489 F. App’x 175 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding that in 
previous cases, defendant “demonstrated a habit of disregarding courtesy to 
opposing counsel, unscrupulous conduct relating to settlement, wasteful 
litigation practices, and unwillingness to follow court orders,” and that in the 
instant case, his “sleight of hand tactics in settlement negotiations, backsliding 
on an agreement for an extension, dilatory conduct in relation to depositions, 
and unwillingness to respect [the court’s] instructions on filing discovery 
motions . . . create[d] inconvenience and waste which negatively affect[ed] 
opposing parties, the Court, and litigants in other cases with meritorious 
claims”). 
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fees to the winning party, if the losing party was the . . . 
defendant and had no defense yet persisted in the trademark 
infringement or false advertising for which he was being 
sued, in order to impose costs on his opponent.”240
Far from being an abstraction, this “abuse of process” 
rationale usefully distinguishes between infringing behavior 
underlying a substantive violation of a trademark right (like 
cybersquatting) and behavior following the establishment of 
that violation whose only significance is in determining 
whether the case is otherwise “exceptional.”  This distinction 
between behavior that violates the Lanham Act and 
“exceptional” behavior in the course of litigation is moreover 
consistent with the express purpose of the attorney’s fees 
provision in the Lanham Act: making “a trademark owner’s 
remedy complete in enforcing his mark against willful 
infringers.”
 
241
In other cases, the court engages in a factor-by-factor 
“bad faith intent to profit” analysis and similarly finds that 
defendant’s litigation behavior (or non-behavior) sets that 
case apart as “exceptional.”  In Mamiya Am. Corp. v. HuaYi 
Bros., Inc.,
  After all, a complete remedy cannot be afforded 
in a case where the infringer acts willfully both in the act of 
infringement and during the course of litigation to establish 
and remedy that infringement.  In the latter case, the 
defendant is imposing additional costs on the plaintiff that 
are over and above the costs incurred because of the 
substantive trademark violation itself. 
242
 
 240. Nightingale Home Healthcare, Inc. v. Anodyne Therapy, LLC, 626 F.3d 
958, 963–64 (7th Cir. 2010); see also AirFX.com v. AirFX, LLC, No. CV 11-
01064-PHX-FJM, 2013 WL 857976 (D. Ariz. Mar. 7, 2013) (“However, we are 
not persuaded that defendant or defendant’s counsel acted in bad faith. 
Nevertheless, because we find that defendant’s counterclaims were groundless 
and unreasonable, we conclude that this case is exceptional within the meaning 
of 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).”). 
 following entry of default judgment, the court 
first observed that the defendant did not possess any 
trademark or intellectual property rights in the disputed 
domain name (ACPA factor one), the domain name did not 
consist of the legal name of its owner, the defendant (ACPA 
factor two), and that the defendant did not make fair or 
 241. H.R. REP. NO. 93-524, at 6 (1973); S. REP. NO. 93-1400, at 6 (1974). 
 242. Mamiya Am. Corp. v. HuaYi Bros., Inc., 09-CV-5501 ENV JO, 2011 WL 
1322383 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2011), adopted by No. 09-CV-5501 ENV JO, 2011 
WL 1253748 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2011). 
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noncommercial use of the plaintiff’s marks on its site (ACPA 
factor four).243  In determining the appropriate amount of 
statutory damages to award, the court noted that defendant’s 
“failure to participate in this action also establishes 
willfulness.”244  Regarding an “exceptional” award of 
attorney’s fees, the court concluded that given the facts of the 
case and its posture, plaintiff had established that 
defendant’s infringement was “both in bad faith and willful” 
and recommended an award of attorney’s fees.245
 
 243. Id. 
 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. (emphasis added); see also Punch Clock, Inc. v. Smart Software Dev., 
553 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1358–59 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (“Plaintiff has established the 
Defendant’s bad faith intent to profit though its well-pleaded allegations of 
SSD’s intent to divert consumers of time keeping software away from PCI with 
the use of the accused domain name, bolstered by the evidence of its ongoing 
willful infringement of the trademark. . . . Given the bad faith and willful 
nature of the violation, the Court finds such an ‘exceptional’ case here and 
concludes that an award of attorneys’ fees and costs is warranted.”); 
Ticketmaster Corp. v. DeVane, No. 7:07-CV-196-F, 2008 WL 2073914 (E.D.N.C. 
May 14, 2008) (finding that defendant’s continued use of plaintiff’s marks after 
receiving a cease and desist letter and failure to appear rendered the case 
exceptional); Taverna Opa Trademark Corp. v. Ismail, No. 08-20776-CIV, 2010 
WL 1838384, at *4  (S.D. Fla. May 6, 2010) (stating that the court was “satisfied 
that the deliberate and willful conduct by [defendant], her concealing her 
whereabouts, and her failure to defend this lawsuit substantiates Taverna 
Opa’s claim for reasonable attorney’s fees and costs under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).”); 
Nucal Foods, Inc. v. Kaye, No. 2:12-CV-2754 KJM AC, 2013 WL 1680643, at *7 
(E.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2013)  (“Willful infringement occurs when the defendant 
knowingly and intentionally infringes on a trademark. Willfulness can also be 
inferred from a defendant’s failure to defend. Here, because the defendant’s 
conduct can be deemed willful and deceptive in light of his failure to defend this 
action, in combination with his demand for payment, plaintiff is entitled to an 
award of attorneys’ fees.”) (citations omitted); Study Logic, LLC v. Clear Net 
Plus, Inc., No. 11 CV 4343 CLP, 2012 WL 4329349, at *15 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 
2012) (“willful infringement may be established by virtue of a defendant’s 
default”) (citing Kenneth Jay Lane v. Heavenly Apparel, Inc., No. 03 CV 2132, 
2006 WL 728407, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2006)); eAdGear, Inc. v. Liu, CV-11-
05398 JCS, 2012 WL 2367805, at *19 (N.D. Cal. June 21, 2012), adopted by No. 
C-11-05398 RMW JCS, 2012 WL 4005454 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2012) 
(“Willfulness can also be inferred from a defendant’s failure to defend.”) (citing 
Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Castworld Prods., Inc., 219 F.R.D. 494, 500 (C.D. Cal. 
2003)).  But see United Air Lines, Inc. v. unitedair.com, No. 1:12CV0143 
GBL/JFA, 2012 WL 2838629, at *7 (E.D. Va. June 11, 2012), adopted by, No. 
1:12CV143 GBL/JFA, 2012 WL 2838569 (E.D. Va. July 9, 2012) (“It would be 
illogical to find that a failure to appear in an in rem proceeding under the ACPA 
may form an independent basis for an award of attorney’s fees under the 
Lanham Act-to do so would convert all unanswered ACPA claims (which are in 
no way exceptional) into ‘exceptional’ cases.”). 
     It is worth noting that, given the discretionary nature of attorney’s fees 
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These cases demonstrate that behavior beyond “bad faith 
intent to profit” in the context of the cybersquatting litigation 
itself can and should be sufficient to render a case 
“exceptional.”246
3. Willful Cybersquatters are Exceptional 
Cybersquatters 
  This behavior is not willful within the 
meaning of the Lanham Act, as it is not part of a substantive 
violation of any trademark right, including rights protected 
by the ACPA.  Nevertheless, the behavior is “exceptional” and 
attorney’s fees may therefore be appropriate to afford 
complete relief to a cybersquatting plaintiff as the plaintiff 
may expend resources in vindicating those rights that she 
would not if the defendant did not engage in such behavior.  
This paper now turns to the second and final definition of the 
“exceptional cybersquatter”—one who acts willfully within 
the meaning of the Lanham Act. 
If a defendant does not default, a cybersquatting plaintiff 
may still be entitled to attorney’s fees if the court believes the 
cybersquatting conduct was willful and thus exceptional.  
Because a defendant in default admits all of the factual 
allegations in the complaint,247 even a court unwilling to 
consider defendant’s failure to defend as “exceptional” 
conduct would be hard pressed to ignore allegations that 
defendant’s infringement was willful.248
 
awards in “exceptional” cases, including those where the exceptional conduct is 
confined to defendant’s failure to appear, default does not always automatically 
trigger an award of attorney’s fees.  See Area 55, Inc. v. Pandamerican LLC, No. 
10-CV-269-H NLS, 2010 WL 3564715, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2010) (“Based 
on allegations by the Plaintiff of Defendants’ violations of the ACPA as well as 
allegations that Defendants deliberately used Area 55’s marks to distract and 
divert Area 55’s marks to distract and divert consumers to their website and 
banner advertisements, the Court holds that Plaintiff is entitled to costs. The 
Court DENIES Plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees.”). 
 
 246. Accord Leighton, supra note 50, at 881 (“Under Lanham Act subsection 
35(a), a district court may use its discretion to award reasonable attorneys’ fees 
to the prevailing party only in ‘exceptional cases’ brought under the Act.  
‘Exceptional cases’ within the meaning of that subsection are limited to . . . 
cases in which the defendant’s violation of the Act was not willful, but in which 
defendant willfully pursued an unfounded defense during the litigation to harm 
the plaintiff, as shown by objectively considering the defendant’s pleadings and 
litigation activities”). 
 247. FED. R. CIV. PROC. 8(b)(6) (“An allegation—other than one relating to 
the amount of damages—is admitted if a responsive pleading is required and 
the allegation is not denied”). 
 248. See, e.g., Wecosign, Inc. v. IFG Holdings, Inc., 845 F. Supp. 2d 1072, 
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In contested cases, willfulness under the Lanham Act, 
that is, willfulness in the context of the substantive body of 
trademark law, is not only appropriately distinguishable from 
the substantive definition of a violation of the ACPA 
(including the “bad faith intent to profit” element) and thus a 
valid justification for determining that a case is 
“exceptional,”249 but an expressly recognized basis for such a 
finding given the legislative history of the Lanham Act’s 
attorney’s fees provision.  Both the House and Senate reports 
on subsection (a) stressed that attorney’s fees awards in 
“exceptional” cases “would make a trademark owner’s remedy 
complete in enforcing his mark against willful infringers.”250  
Further, as Leighton points out, “willfulness” includes 
“malicious, fraudulent, and deliberate” behavior such that 
Congress’s definition of the “exceptional case” and a definition 
of the “exceptional cybersquatter” that depends first on a 
finding of willfulness is also consistent with Congress’s 
understanding of that term.251
Unlike the ACPA’s explicit introduction of “bad faith” 
into the Lanham Act, “willfulness” has a long and storied 
history in trademark law and is, in some jurisdictions, a 
requirement for an award of damages under section 
1117(a).
 
252
 
1086 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (stating that “the Ninth Circuit has upheld awards of 
attorneys’ fees solely because, by entry of default judgment, the district court 
determined, as alleged in [plaintiff’s] complaint, that [defendant’s] acts were 
committed knowingly, maliciously, and oppressively, and with an intent to . . . 
injure [plaintiff].  Here, Plaintiff alleged that Defendants’ acts were ‘willful and 
deliberate.’  Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiff is entitled to 
attorneys’ fees.”) (alterations in original) (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
  This subpart argues that where defendant’s 
willfulness is established under the Lanham Act 
independently of any conduct within the ambit of the “bad 
 249. Accord Leighton, supra note 50, at 880 (“ ‘ Exceptional cases’ within the 
meaning of that subsection are limited to (1) cases in which the defendant 
willfully violated the Act”). 
 250. H.R. REP. NO. 93-524, at 6 (1973); S. REP. NO. 93-1400, at 6 (1974). 
 251. See Leighton, supra note 50, at 881. 
 252. 5 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 30:92 (4th ed. 2011) (“In most cases of judicial increases in 
damages or profits, the defendant is at least a knowing and intentional 
infringer”); Ross, supra note 42, at § 4.02[2][b] (collecting cases that require or 
at least consider willful infringement in deciding whether to award various 
remedies under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) following a 1999 amendment that added the 
words “or a willful violation under section 43(c)” to the first sentence of section 
(a)). 
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faith intent to profit” factors under the ACPA, the case is 
indeed “exceptional” and a court may proceed to consider 
whether an attorney’s fees award is appropriate in its 
discretion. 
Distinguishing between “bad faith intent to profit” and 
“willfulness” can be as analytically tricky as distinguishing 
between “bad faith intent to profit” and “exceptional” conduct 
warranting a discretionary award of attorney’s fees.  In City 
of Carlsbad v. Shah,253 the court began its analysis of “bad 
faith intent to profit” under the ACPA by stating that it must 
“look at the individual circumstances of the case, including 
whether the infringing activity was willful.”254  Not only does 
this obviously confuse “bad faith intent to profit” analysis 
with willfulness analysis, but the authority cited for the 
proposition, Lahoti v. VeriCheck, Inc.,255 , addresses an 
entirely different issue—not bad faith intent to profit, but 
willfulness in the context of determining whether the ACPA’s 
safe harbor provisions applied to defendant’s behavior.256
In determining bad faith intent, “[w]illfulness can be 
inferred by the fact that a defendant continued infringing 
behavior after being given notice” of the allegations of 
infringement.  Louis Vuitton Malletier and Oakley, Inc. v. 
Veit, 211 F. Supp. 2d 567, 583 (E.D. Pa. 2002).  
Additionally, the courts consider the egregiousness of the 
defendant’s cybersquatting and other behavior evidencing 
an attitude of contempt.  Verizon California, Inc. v. 
Onlinenic, Inc., 2009 WL 2706393 *3–6 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
  
Similarly, later in the same discussion, court stated that: 
257
However, both Veit and Verizon California discussed 
willfulness in the context of determining the appropriate 
amount of statutory damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c)—a 
discussion that would only be appropriate after a finding of 
“bad faith intent to profit” under the ACPA.
 
258
 
 253. City of Carlsbad v. Shah, 850 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1106 (S.D. Cal. 2012). 
 
 254. Id. (emphasis added). 
 255. 586 F.3d 1190, 1203 (9th Cir. 2009) 
 256. Shah, 850 F. Supp. 2d at 1106 (citing Lahoti, 586 F.3d at 1203). 
 257. Id. 
 258. See also Two Plus Two Pub., LLC v. Boyd, No. 2:09-CV-02318-KJD, 
2012 WL 724678 (D. Nev. Mar. 1, 2012) (engaging in an extensive, factor-by-
factor, bad faith intent analysis on a motion for summary judgment, concluding 
that the plaintiff had made an undisputed showing that the defendant acted 
with bad faith intent to profit, awarding statutory damages based on that 
showing and “scant evidence of Defendant’s success,” and also finding, without 
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It is also important to note that a pattern and practice of 
cybersquatting falls within the ambit of ACPA factor eight: 
In determining whether a person has a bad faith intent 
described under subparagraph (A), a court may consider 
factors such as, but not limited to . . . the person’s 
registration or acquisition of multiple domain names 
which the person knows are identical or confusingly 
similar to marks of others that are distinctive at the time 
of registration of such domain names, or dilutive of famous 
marks of others that are famous at the time of registration 
of such domain names, without regard to the goods or 
services of the parties.259
Thus, willful conduct that consists only of “serial” 
cybersquatting is not sufficient to render a cybersquatter’s 
conduct “exceptional.”
 
260
An example of willfulness separable from “bad faith 
intent to profit” is In re Gharbi,
 
261
 
additional discussion, “that because Defendant’s conduct was willfull [sic] it 
qualifies as ‘exceptional’ and awards attorney’s fees and costs to Plaintiff.”). 
 where the bankruptcy 
court appropriately engaged in a factor-by-factor ACPA 
analysis finding that the defendant did not have any 
intellectual property rights in three disputed domain names 
 259. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(VIII) (2012). 
 260. Cf. Lahoti, 636 F.3d at 510–11 (finding that infringement is exceptional 
when a defendant knowingly registered plaintiff’s mark as a website address, 
tried to extort thousands of dollars from the plaintiff, had a pattern and practice 
of cybersquatting, and had a pattern of abusive discovery and litigation 
conduct); Harry & David v. Pathak, No. CIV. 09-3013-CL, 2010 WL 4955780 (D. 
Or. Oct. 29, 2010), adopted by, No. CIV. 09-3013-CL, 2010 WL 4955715 (D. Or. 
Nov. 30, 2010); Verizon Cal. Inc. v. Onlinenic, Inc., No. C 08-2832 JF (RS), 2009 
WL 2706393 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2009) (considering a “pattern or practice” of 
registering and using multiple domain names (in that case, 663) that are 
“identical or confusingly similar” to a plaintiff’s marks (ACPA bad faith factor 
eight) “willful and outrageous conduct alone [] sufficient for the Court to 
conclude that Verizon must be awarded its reasonable attorneys’ fees under § 
1117.”  The Verizon court also found defendant’s failure to oppose plaintiff’s 
argument for attorney’s fees and its attendant concession that the case was 
“exceptional” was an independent basis for finding the case to be, in fact, 
“exceptional.”); Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476, 487 (3d Cir. 2001).  In some 
cases there may be both serial cybersquatting (bad faith perhaps, but 
unexceptional under the argument advanced here) and truly exceptional, willful 
conduct.  See GoPets Ltd. v. Hise, No. CV07-01870 AHM VBKX, 2012 WL 
3962789 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2012) (finding that defendants registered over 
1,300 domain names and that they “attempted, only a few months ago, to 
‘reverse hijack’ Plaintiff’s domain name, gopets.net”). 
 261. In re Gharbi, No. 08-11023-CAG, 2011 WL 831706 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 
Mar. 3, 2011), aff’d, No. A-11-CA-291 LY, 2011 WL 2181197 (W.D. Tex. June 3, 
2011). 
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(ACPA factor one); that although defendant had a license to 
use plaintiff’s mark in defendant’s domain names under a 
franchise agreement (ACPA factor three), termination of that 
agreement revoked the license and defendant was on notice 
that he no longer had any right to use the mark (ACPA factor 
four);262 and that following termination of the franchise 
agreements, defendant used plaintiff’s mark (as incorporated 
in the disputed domain names) for commercial purposes after 
the termination of the agreement (ACPA factor five).263
In making the determination that Defendant violated the 
ACPA, the Court holds that Defendant acted with the bad 
faith intent to profit from Plaintiff’s marks.  [Additional 
testimony] shows that Defendant knew that what he was 
doing was wrong and Defendant was previously told by 
the Plaintiff to cease using the marks.  Defendant acted 
willfully in choosing to keep the websites at issue in 
operation and to use them as pointers to his new website.  
The Court therefore finds that Defendant’s conduct 
renders this an exceptional case and Plaintiff is entitled to 
reasonable attorneys’ fees.
  
Awarding statutory damages under subsection (d) and 
attorney’s fees under subsection (a), the bankruptcy court 
stated that: 
264
Willfulness will most often be found in cases of 
“deliberate and flagrant” infringement, as in Newport News 
Holdings Corp. v. Virtual City Vision, Inc.,
 
265 a recent case 
from the Fourth Circuit, where the district court found the 
defendant had transformed a website into a women’s fashion 
website after being put on notice by a decision of the Internet 
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) that 
the plaintiff—a women’s clothing and accessories company—
had rights in the marks at issue.266
 
 262. The court also found that although the defendant had the right to use 
the trademark at issue in his company’s domain names under certain franchise 
agreements (that is, he did not register or initially use the domain names with 
bad faith intent to profit), once the agreements were terminated, he no longer 
had use of the mark and did not fall within the ACPA’s safe harbor provision.  
In re Gharbi, 2011 WL 831706. 
  Because the defendant 
was unable “to provide a legitimate justification for its 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. 
 265. Newport News Holdings Corp. v. Virtual City Vision, Inc., 650 F.3d 423, 
441 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 266. Id. 
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decision to shift its website’s focus to women’s clothing, 
particularly in the face of the ICANN panel’s implicit 
suggestion that to do so courted the risk of a finding of bad 
faith,” the district court’s finding that the case was 
“exceptional” was not clear error.267
Finally, as noted above, the latest addition to 15 U.S.C. § 
1117, subsection (e), establishes a rebuttable presumption of 
willfulness “for purposes of determining relief” if a 
cybersquatter “knowingly provides . . . materially false 
contact information to a domain name registrar, domain 
name registry, or other domain name registration authority 
in registering, maintaining, or renewing a domain name used 
in connection with the violation.”
 
268
Thus, in Translucent Communications, LLC v. Americas 
Premiere Corp.,
 
269 the court methodically applied the bad 
faith intent factors, determining that seven of the nine listed 
in section 1125(d)(1)(B)(i) “weigh[ed] in favor of Translucent 
and clearly demonstrate a bad faith intent by Defendants.”270  
The court also stated that defendants’s diversion of internet 
users from plaintiff’s website was “strong evidence of 
Defendants’ bad faith intent and this factor alone, Factor five, 
sufficiently establishes Defendants’ bad faith intent.”271  
Further, citing section 1117(e),272 the court determined that 
one of the defendants provided false contact information to 
the disputed domain name’s registrar and diverted plaintiff’s 
domain name “to exact punishment or harm,” conduct the 
court found to be “egregious” for purposes of assessing 
statutory damages.273  When assessing attorney’s fees, the 
court specifically cited the latter—defendant’s diversion of 
plaintiff’s domain name via the provision of false contact 
information—as a basis for finding that defendants’ 
“malicious, fraudulent, willful, [and] deliberate” conduct 
rendered the case “exceptional.”274
 
 267. Id. 
 
 268. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(e) (2008); see also supra notes 94–96 and accompanying 
text. 
 269. Translucent Commc’s, LLC v. Ams. Premiere Corp., No. CIV.A. WGC-
08-3235, 2010 WL 723937 (D. Md. Feb. 24, 2010). 
 270. Id. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Id. 
 273. Id. 
 274. Id. 
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4. An Attempt at Simplification 
The Venn diagram below is useful in illustrating how 
these three areas of conduct—“bad faith intent to profit,” 
litigation conduct, and willful conduct—interrelate.  As stated 
above, facts supporting the elemental determination of “bad 
faith intent to profit” that do not also support a finding of 
either litigation misconduct or conduct considered willful 
under the Lanham Act, are insufficient to support a finding 
that a case involves “exceptional” cybersquatting. 
 
 
 
Conversely, where facts supporting the determination 
that an alleged cybersquatter possessed the requisite “bad 
faith intent to profit” also support a finding of litigation 
misconduct or willful conduct (that is, where “bad faith intent 
to profit” overlaps with either litigation misconduct, willful 
conduct, or both), a finding that a case is “exceptional” is 
appropriate and attorney’s fees award may be awarded.  And, 
where facts in addition to those supporting a determination 
that an alleged cybersquatter possessed the requisite “bad 
faith intent to profit” establish that the cybersquatter also 
engaged in litigation misconduct or willful conduct (or both), 
the case is similarly “exceptional.” 
Bad faith intent to 
profit 
(unexceptional 
alone) 
Willful conduct Litigation misconduct 
CUMBY FINAL 5/23/2014  12:41 PM 
2014] THE EXCEPTIONAL CYBERSQUATTER 367 
CONCLUSION 
This review and analysis of the text and legislative 
history of the ACPA and the Lanham Act’s remedial 
provisions and the selective survey of relevant case law 
presented here persuasively demonstrate several, 
interrelated principles.  First, notwithstanding certain 
language in the Ninth Circuit’s K and N Engineering decision 
that suggests attorney’s fees awards under the Lanham Act 
are “tied” to awards of actual damages and profits, there is no 
basis for an outright denial of an attorney’s fees award to a 
plaintiff who elects to receive statutory damages instead of 
actual damages for a violation of the ACPA. 
Second, and more importantly, in determining whether a 
case is truly “exceptional” for purposes of making an 
attorney’s fees award given a violation of the ACPA (either in 
conjunction with an actual or statutory damages award), 
there must be a distinction between the conduct constituting 
the violation itself (which is in no way “exceptional”) and the 
“exceptional” conduct that warrants the exercise of the court’s 
discretion to make that attorney’s fees awards.  This 
distinction is necessary to preserve the meaning of the term 
“exceptional,” honor the intent and purpose behind its 
inclusion in the Lanham Act (as well as the policies 
underlying the American Rule), and give the ACPA its proper 
scope within the broader context of trademark law. 
 
